4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
344.
SIS did not
inform No.10 or others that the source who had provided
the
reporting
issued on 11 and 23 September 2002, about production of chemical
and
biological
agent, had been lying to SIS.
345.
On 2 February
2003, there was further reporting that the sub-source had
not
produced
the material.130
346.
By 18
February, the source was being described as having been revealed to
have
been lying
to SIS over a period of time.131
347.
By 3 March,
SIS had concluded that there was no further material and that
SIS
would seek
to make direct contact with the sub-source.132
348.
The reissue of
the reports in April 2003 and the subsequent withdrawal of
this
stream of
reporting in July 2003 is addressed later in this
Section.
349.
At
Mr Blair’s request, members of Cabinet were briefed by
Mr Scarlett in
February
2003.
350.
Mr Scarlett
also briefed the Chairmen of the House of Commons
Committees
on Foreign
Affairs and Defence and the Intelligence and Security
Committee.
351.
Following
Cabinet on 6 February, Mr Blair asked Mr Scarlett “to
provide a
confidential
and intelligence based briefing on Iraq for small groups of
Ministers
attending
Cabinet”. The briefing would “take as its starting point Part 1 of
the
Government’s
dossier published last September” and cover:
•
the “latest
assessment of Iraq’s holding of weapons of mass
destruction”;
•
the Iraqi
response to resolution 1441;
•
“recent
developments in Iraq and our current assessment of the cohesion
of
the regime”;
and
•
“Iraq and
terrorism”.133
352.
Four “briefing
sessions” were offered the following week.
353.
Mr Scarlett
briefed the ISC on 5 February, following up a previous briefing
on
130
SIS record,
2 February 2003.
131
SIS record,
18 February 2003.
132
SIS record,
3 March 2003.
133
Minute
PS/Chairman JIC to Prout, 7 February 2003, ‘Intelligence Briefing
on Iraq’.
134
Minute
Scarlett to Heads of Intelligence Agencies, 10 February 2003,
‘Intelligence and Security
Committee:
Iraq Briefing’.
355