3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
12.
Mr Blair
used an interview with the Arabic Service of Radio
Monte Carlo on
14 November
to send a message to Saddam Hussein, the Iraqi people and the
Arab
world that
it was Saddam Hussein’s fault that the people of Iraq were not
enjoying real
wealth and
prosperity.3
He declared
that the objective of the United Nations resolution
was
disarmament not regime change.
13.
Mr Blair
emphasised that Saddam Hussein’s duty was to co‑operate fully with
the
inspectors
by providing an “honest declaration [of Iraq’s proscribed
capabilities]” and
then to
co‑operate in eradicating them. Mr Blair added that if Saddam
did not disarm the
consequence
would be that he would be “disarmed by force”. The choice for
Saddam
Hussein was
“very, very clear”.
14.
Mr Blair
also stated that weapons of mass destruction and terrorism were
two
separate,
but linked issues that had to be dealt with:
“… if we
allow countries which have got repressive and brutal regimes to
develop
these
weapons, at some point they will use them, and that is why we have
got to
take the
action.”
15.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet on 14 November that while the Security
Council
would need
to be reconvened to discuss any breach in the event of
Iraqi
non‑compliance,
the key aspect of resolution 1441 was that military action
could
be taken
without a further resolution.
16.
Mr Straw
told Cabinet on 14 November that Iraq was required to accept the
terms
of
resolution 1441 by the end of that week. Iraq had sent the UN a
tirade of abuse but
the
response was nevertheless positive.4
The
requirement for Iraq to make a declaration
of its
holdings of weapons of mass destruction and the facilities for
developing
such
weapons was more important. The new inspection regime would start
work by
23 December.
17.
Mr Straw
stated that a “key aspect of the resolution was that there was
no
requirement
for a second resolution before action was taken against Iraq in the
event
of its
non‑compliance, although reconvening the Security Council to
discuss any breach
was clearly
stated”.
18.
Mr Blair
concluded that “the Iraq regime was under pressure and the
leadership was
concerned
about the reliability of internal support”.
19.
The issue of
whether assurances to Cabinet that military action could be
taken
without a
further resolution accurately reflected the position of
Lord Goldsmith at that
time is
addressed in Section 5.
3
The
National Archives, 14 November 2002, Prime
Minister gives interview to Radio Monte Carlo.
4
Cabinet
Conclusions, 14 November 2002.
7