6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
had not
been identified, and there seemed to be no “overarching campaign
strategy for
dealing
with Iraq”.
344.
An updated
plan would be briefed to President Bush in August, and the
US
planning
was designed “to put CENTCOM in a position to be able to activate
their plan
from August
2002 onwards”. A “de facto invitation to the UK and Australia to
participate”
was “now on
the table”. The plan would require availability of bases and
support from
Kuwait,
Jordan and Turkey.
345.
Mr Watkins
reported that Mr Hoon intended to respond positively to
the
invitation
for a small number of British planners to join US planning teams;
that was
“essential
in helping to inform the MOD’s own thinking” so that Mr Hoon
could make
recommendations.
But Mr Hoon was:
“… very
conscious that decisions about a military contribution cannot be
made in
the absence
of a coherent and integrated strategic framework. An agreed
strategy
will be key
to taking matters forward, not simply to provide justification for
military
action, but
to clarify timelines; to incorporate the Prime Minister’s
conditions for
UK
participation; and to establish the framework for an information
campaign. The
draft
public document, which you are currently considering, would
ultimately form
an
important part of that campaign. He suggests that the Prime
Minister may like
to call an
early meeting of a small group of colleagues to consider how best
to get
the US to
address the strategic, as opposed to the narrowly military,
dimension.
The freestanding
military option is not a viable political proposition.
“Meanwhile,
officials from the MOD, FCO and Cabinet Office should do some
more
homework
urgently to put the Prime Minister and you in a better position to
influence
the
President’s and Condi Rice’s thinking … before the updated CENTCOM
plan
is briefed
to the President in the course of August. Mr Hoon will also
review the
possibilities
for contact with the US Defense Secretary.”
346.
The
preparation and content of the draft public document on Iraq
referred to by
Mr Watkins,
the “dossier”, is addressed in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
347.
The Treasury’s
reaction to Mr Hoon’s minute is addressed in Section
13.
348.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Blair on 8 July supporting Mr Hoon’s
suggestion for an early
349.
Mr Straw
stated that the report of US planning had raised several points
which
concerned
him, including:
•
There was
“no strategic concept for the military plan”. US military planning
had
“so far
taken place in a vacuum”.
163
Minute
Straw to
Prime Minister, 8 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency
Planning’.
227