14.1 |
Military equipment (post-conflict)
527.
On 22 March,
Lord Drayson’s Private Office recorded that:
“Given the
present tempo of operations, and the threat the Army are
typically
facing
during deployments, Lord Drayson believes it is imperative that
we
ensure we
are providing them (in both the near and long term) with
appropriately
protected
vehicles. This will clearly involve both addressing the present
operational
requirement,
and ensuring that FRES is brought into service no later than
2012.”275
528.
On 22 March,
an MOD official from DCRS(BM) advised Lord Drayson on
how
the
remaining 104 Vector vehicles (from the 166 total) might be
procured with Treasury
funding.276
The
manufacturer would be working “flat out” to produce the initial
purchase
and there
was “no scope to produce either more vehicles [between March and
May
2007], or
bring forward the delivery timeline”.
529.
Approval had
been given to buy as many vehicles as the available funding
would
allow but,
due to the late inclusion of an additional protection measure
against EFPs,
it was
“possible” that fewer than 62 would be purchased.
530.
The official
added that there were “anticipated requirements for future
PPV
capabilities
in the short and long terms”. Lord Drayson was advised that a
follow‑on
purchase
could be made in the short term either through UOR or Equipment
Programme
action to
meet the “full Defence wide requirement”.
531.
Considering
the UOR route, the official wrote that the requirement for
additional
Vector
vehicles had not been included in the financial estimate for
Afghanistan approved
by Cabinet.
It was therefore not advised to approach Treasury until the
operational
requirement
was “sufficiently mature”, coupled with some operational experience
of
Snatch’s
performance in Afghanistan. Delaying a UOR until September would
not
have an
impact on the delivery schedule, given that the manufacturer was
working at
maximum
capacity to deliver the first tranche of vehicles. “Initial
informal soundings”
from the
Treasury were that:
“… not only
would the requirement need to be robust (ie a clear explanation of
why
Snatch, for
which they have already provided UOR funding is not appropriate
at
all for Op
HERRICK, and that no other in‑service vehicle … would not fill the
gap),
but also
that the costs would need to fall within our currently negotiated
funding
envelope.”
532.
Raising an
Equipment Programme enhancement option was an alternative route
to
secure the
vehicles which again would not have an impact on the delivery
schedule. The
official
advised that, whilst it was “likely” that procuring additional
Vector vehicles would
be seen as
“a high priority across Defence”, it was noted that “other
competing priorities
275
Minute
Pfeffer to CM(BM) and DCRS, 22 March 2006, ‘Armoured
Vehicles’.
276
Minute DCRS
(BM) [junior official] to APS/Min(DP), 22 March 2006, ‘Project
Vector – Protected Patrol
Vehicles’.
87