13.1 |
Resources
245.
If a total of
£60m was available from those sources in 2003/04, DFID
planned
initially
to commit £35m to meet immediate relief needs. Exactly how that
amount
should be
allocated would depend on the nature of the conflict and other
factors, but
an indicative
allocation might be:
•
£20m to
support the work of UN agencies, the Red Cross and NGOs
across
Iraq;
•
£5m to fund
QIPs delivered by the UK military, to help generate stability
within
communities;
and
•
£10m for
DFID’s own rapid response capacity.
246.
The official
commented:
“Under many
scenarios, £35 million is unlikely to be perceived as an
adequate
UK
contribution to any immediate relief effort, particularly if OFF
collapses.
Leaving
£25 million for further humanitarian need, medium‑term
rehabilitation and
reconstruction
could also look very sparse. Action in response to the Secretary
of
State’s
previous two letters [Ms Short’s letters of 5 and 14
February] to the Prime
Minister on
this rests with No.10.”
247.
The official
also advised:
“If the
military is involved in the direct delivery of humanitarian
assistance, there will
be an issue
about who pays. MOD claim to be financially stretched and are keen
for
DFID to
pay.”
248.
Ms Short
held a meeting the following day to discuss that advice, attended
by
Dr Brewer,
Mr Fernie and other DFID officials.154
Mr Chakrabarti
did not attend, but
a copy
of the record of the meeting was sent to his Private
Office.
249.
Ms Short
said that she was concerned that much of what was proposed in
the
submission
“pre‑supposed the financial comfort we had so far failed to receive
from
the
Treasury”. She was “unwilling, without a clear financial package,
to plan to do more
than
support the UN, key international agencies, and perhaps provide
some funding to
the UK
military for QIPs”. She had repeatedly made it clear (to
Mr Blair in person and
in writing,
and in the House of Commons) that DFID did not have the financial
resources
to play a
major role.
250.
Within those
constraints, Ms Short was content for officials:
•
to start
discussions about possible support to non‑governmental
organisations
(NGOs) not
yet involved in Iraq that had specific technical expertise in
areas
such as
water and sanitation;
154
Minute
Bewes to DFID [junior official], 19 February 2003, ‘Iraq
Contingency Planning: Update’.
483