The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
JAM1
accepted. The officials said that any such meeting would be useful
at present, as
there was
still too much violence in Basra.
527.
On releases,
JAM1 said that his new plan was that five prisoners should
be
released on
10 November, with a steady stream of releases for the next two
months.
JAM1 asked
that his own release should form part of the 10 November
batch.
528.
The officials
concluded:
“… [JAM1]’s
assurance that hostilities are not about to resume … and
[JAM1]’s
claim that
the Secret Cells are signed up (we have some scanty collateral for
that)
are all
positives although all such assurances should be treated with
circumspection
…
“But
[JAM1]’s request for his own release will be hard to play. He has
proved
relentless
on releases to date and we sense that, however much we seek to
draw
it into the
light, JAM’s feral instincts also remain fixed on the subject. It
may be that,
at heart,
[JAM1] still fears transfer to American custody … But whilst we
might score
negotiating
points and perhaps even achieve concessions down the road we
should
be in no
doubt that both [JAM1] and his JAM supporters will take this one to
the
wire. We
sense that they, particularly [JAM1] have more to lose than we now.
But
they might
not think so and the next set of negotiations will be
hard.”
529.
On 23 October,
Mr Browne told the House of Commons Select Committee
on
Defence
that:
“The
security situation in Basra, in our assessment and in the
assessment of the
Iraqis
themselves who are of course important assessors of this, is that
it remains
stable …
Attacks on Multi-National Forces decreased by 90 percent in
September
and the
overall figure is 19 compared to August when it was 190 … The other
aspect
of course
of violence is crime against Iraqis themselves … it has remained at
similar
levels to
those seen in August prior to the handover of Basra
Palace.”252
530.
On 23 October,
AM Peach briefed the Chiefs of Staff that tension between the
Iraqi
Government
and the MNF-I had increased.253
Among the
contributing factors were an
incident on
16 September in which a private military security company had its
operating
licence
revoked after being accused of excessive force in a convoy
protection incident,
a number of
Iraqi civilian deaths in Sadr City on 21 October caused by the
MNF-I,
increased
use of airstrikes and a belief that the MNF-I had been arming the
Sunni bloc.
In his
view, these tensions might lead to changes to the draft resolution,
and so delay it.
531.
The Chiefs of
Staff observed that “legal advice would be required to
establish
the status
of UK forces should the current UNSCR lapse without replacement
by
31 December
2007”.
252
Select
Committee on Defence Minutes of Evidence, 23 October 2007,
Q4.
253
Minutes, 23
October 2007, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
280