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5  |  Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003
525.  Lord Goldsmith noted:
“… Previous practice of the Council and statements made by Council members
during the negotiation of resolution 1441 demonstrate that the phrase ‘material
breach’ signifies a finding by the Council of a sufficiently serious breach of the
cease-fire conditions to revive the authorisation in resolution 678 and that ‘serious
consequences’ is accepted as indicating the use of force.”
526.  Lord Goldsmith wrote:
“ … I disagree, therefore, with those commentators and lawyers who assert
that nothing less than an explicit authorisation to use force in a Security Council
resolution will be sufficient.”
The revival argument – the effect of resolution 1441 (2002)
527.  Having accepted the validity of the revival argument Lord Goldsmith
addressed the question of whether resolution 1441 was sufficient to revive the
authorisation in resolution 678 without an assessment by the Security Council
that the basis of the cease-fire established in resolution 687 had been destroyed.
528.  Lord Goldsmith wrote:
“In order for the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 to be revived, there
needs to be a determination by the Security Council that there is a violation of the
conditions of the cease-fire and that the Security Council considers it sufficiently
serious to destroy the basis of the cease-fire. Revival will not, however, take place,
notwithstanding a finding of violation, if the Security Council has made clear either
that action short of the use of force should be taken to ensure compliance with
the terms of the cease-fire, or that it intends to decide subsequently what action
is required to ensure compliance.”
529.  He continued:
“Notwithstanding the determination of material breach in OP1 of resolution 1441,
it is clear that the Council did not intend that the authorisation in resolution 678
should revive immediately following the adoption of resolution 1441, since OP2
of the resolution affords Iraq a ‘final opportunity’ to comply with its disarmament
obligations under previous resolutions by co-operating with the enhanced inspection
regime described in OPs 3 and 5-9. But OP2 also states that the Council has
determined that compliance with resolution 1441 is Iraq’s last chance before the
cease-fire resolution will be enforced.”
530.  On that basis, Lord Goldsmith expressed the view that:
“OP2 has the effect therefore of suspending the legal consequences of the OP1
determination of material breach which would otherwise have triggered the revival
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