The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
723.
Ms Short held
a meeting on 21 October, attended by Mr Chakrabarti, to
discuss
contingency
planning. At the meeting Ms Short agreed that DFID officials
should
“indicate
an intention” to join the FCO-led delegation attending inter-agency
talks in
Washington
on 6 November, with a final decision to follow
later.360
724.
Sir Suma
Chakrabarti told the Inquiry that DFID received an email from the
Cabinet
Office on
23 October saying No.10 was happy for the department to talk
discreetly to
some NGOs
if it was clear the aim was disarmament not war.361
725.
Sir Suma
stated that, although the email made no reference to contacting the
UN,
he and Ms
Short had decided in early November that “we just had to do
so”.362
726.
The Inquiry
has not seen a copy of the Cabinet Office email.
727.
Sir Suma
Chakrabarti was asked by the Inquiry whether he had been instructed
by
his
Secretary of State not to share information (with US
officials).363
He replied:
“At no
stage”, and
that he was “Absolutely sure” of that.
728.
Sir Suma’s
evidence does not match the instruction sent out by Ms Short’s
office
on 15
October.
729.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told the Inquiry that the first contact between
UKMIS
New York
and the UN Secretariat to discuss post-conflict planning was in
October 2002,
“probably
at their request”.364
730.
Sir Jeremy
reported from New York on 30 October that UN post-conflict
planning
was
“embryonic”. There were indications of support for a “pillared”
model for post-
conflict
administration somewhere between the approaches adopted for Kosovo
and
Afghanistan,
but planning for a possible UN administration was happening at a
very low
level. That
reflected an instruction from the Secretary-General that work on
what was
effectively
planning for the UN to take over from the sovereign government of a
member
state
should be very low key.365
731.
On 31 October,
the Cabinet Office reported to Sir David Manning that the
wider
instruction
to departments not to engage external actors was, in practice,
being
overtaken.366
There was
particular pressure for consultation from the UK oil
industry:
a delegation
from BP would be visiting the FCO on 6 November.
732.
On 4 November,
Ms Short agreed that a revised version of the DFID paper
on
the
potential humanitarian implications of conflict in Iraq should be
shared with the US
360
Minute
Bewes to Fernie, 22 October 2002, ‘Iraq’.
361
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 12.
362
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 14.
363
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 17.
364
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, pages 4-5.
365
Telegram
2073 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 30 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Day
After Planning: Possible
UN
Administration’.
366
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 31 October 2002, ‘Iraq: After the UNSCR’.
234