10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
situation
is benign will do two things: first, reward good behaviour and
encourage
further
progress … and secondly, benefit the whole of the country
…
“I am not
responsible for economic regeneration, and I do not intend to
become
a bore
about it – so I mention it now – once, and once only. But since I
am not
responsible,
I cannot be made accountable for the failures of
others.”105
185.
Mr Blair
visited Baghdad on 21 December.106
186.
Mr Chaplin’s
briefing for Mr Blair described an Iraqi Government that
was
struggling
to maintain supplies of power and fuel as the insurgency took hold,
and that
had
abandoned hope of visible progress on reconstruction before the
elections.107
187.
During his
visit, Mr Blair asked Gen Riley for advice on “big-ticket”
items that might
make a
difference to the economy and essential services of southern
Iraq.108
188.
Mr Quarrey’s
report on the visit recorded that “Iraqiisation and political
outreach
were key
themes”.109
Mr Blair
remained “very concerned about the slow pace of
reconstruction
spending, especially in the South” and about the funding available
for
Iraqiisation,
and wanted the UK to make a major effort to secure greater funding
for
both, in
particular from the US. A copy of the report was sent to
Mr Benn’s Principal
Private
Secretary.
189.
Gen Riley
responded to Mr Blair’s request for big-ticket projects on 3
January
2005, in
his weekly report to Gen Walker.110
He proposed
that, at a minimum, the UK
should aim
to build a 200 megawatt (MW) gas turbine plant in the South at a
cost of up
to US$100m.
USAID estimated that up to four additional power stations needed to
be
constructed
in Iraq each year to 2020, but only one was currently planned in
the South,
which would
be funded by Japan. A new power plant would be a visible
contribution
to the
South and to Iraq, would boost long-term investment and would
provide a more
reliable
power supply to the oil sector, essential services and Iraqi
citizens.
190.
The MOD sent
Gen Riley’s report to No.10 on 4 January.111
It was not
included in
Mr Quarrey’s
weekly round-up on Iraq for Mr Blair (which issued on 7
January), and the
Inquiry has
seen no evidence that the report was passed to
Mr Blair.112
191.
Gen Riley’s
proposal was addressed in a DFID review of
infrastructure
requirements
in the South the following month.
105
Report
Riley, 20 December 2004, ‘GOC MND(SE) – southern Iraq Update – 20
December 04’.
106
BBC
News, 21 December
2004, Blair’s
statement in Baghdad.
107
Telegram
494 Baghdad to FCO London, 21 December 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s
Visit to Iraq,
21
December: Scenesetter’.
108
Report
Riley, 3 January 2005, ‘GOC MND(SE) – southern Iraq Update – 3
January 2005’.
109
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 23 December 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Iraq:
Follow-up’.
110
Report
Riley, 3 January 2005, ‘GOC MND(SE) – southern Iraq Update – 3
January 2005’.
111 Letter
Naworynsky to Quarrey, 4 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Update’
attaching Report
Riley, 3 January 2005,
‘GOC
MND(SE) – southern Iraq Update – 3 January 2005’.
112
Minute
Quarrey to Prime Minister, 7 January 2005, ‘Iraq: Weekly
Round-up’.
227