4.4 | The search for WMD

strength. Its activities will now need to be circumscribed … This will be unwelcome

to the US but that is the consequence of the arrangements put in place by 1546.”451

806. The Op ROCKINGHAM weekly update of 1 July reported that:

• The UK element of the ISG had withdrawn from all debriefing activity while

discussions continued on the legal basis for future ISG operations.

• Prime Minister Allawi had nominated Dr Mowaffak al-Rubaie, his National

Security Adviser, as the IIG point of contact for the ISG.452

807. In a Note for President Bush on 16 June, Mr Blair stated that the truth on

Iraq’s WMD was probably that Saddam Hussein:

“ … was developing long range ballistic missile capability in breach of UN

resolutions; he probably had no or no large stockpiles of tactical CW or

BW weapons; but he retained the capability and expertise to recommence

production as soon as he could, again in breach of UN resolutions.”

808. Mr Blair’s “hunch” was that the Butler Review would reach similar

conclusions. Both Lord Butler and the Senate Intelligence Committee were

“bound to be critical … in certain respects”.

809. On 16 June, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent Dr Rice a Note written by Mr Blair for

President Bush about the need for a strategic plan for Iraq (see Section 9.2).453

810. In relation to the need “to deal with any WMD/intelligence issues”, Mr Blair wrote

that he remained “deeply concerned” about WMD:

“The public need an explanation and there will linger a real trust/truth issue …

“At present the public debate lurches between the two extremes: pro-war people

insist the intelligence was right, but the plain fact is no WMD has been found; anti-

war people claim it was all a fraud, as if Saddam never really had any WMD, which

is plainly fatuous … [T]he ISG thinking, and probably the truth, is somewhere in

between. He was developing long range ballistic missile capability in breach of

UN resolutions; he probably had no or no large stockpiles of tactical CW or BW

weapons; but he retained the capability and expertise to recommence production as

soon as he could, again in breach of UN resolutions. And, of course, with the missile

capability, he could fit any warhead he wanted at the appropriate time.

451 Manuscript comment Ehrman, 2 July 2004, on Minute Smith to PS [FCO], 1 July 2004, ‘Iraq – Detention

Issues and the ISG’.

452 Op ROCKINGHAM Weekly No.53, 25 June – 1 July 2004.

453 Letter Sheinwald to Rice, 16 June 2004, [untitled], attaching [Blair to Bush] Note.

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