The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“A more
advanced design suitable for deployment on a missile would
almost
certainly
involve more development work and explosive trials. I have no feel
for
timescale
but 2-3 years is a good guess. Again most of this work can be done
in
advance of
acquiring the fissile material.”
431.
Mr Webb
told the Inquiry that there was a “pretty sharp contrast” between
the
US and UK
assessments of the time required by Iraq to obtain a nuclear
weapon.186
Mr Doug
Feith, US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, had told him that
the US
view was:
“We think they can get to a nuclear device within a few months.”
That had
prompted
him to ask the DIS for advice.
432.
Mr Webb
added that, in relation to essential components for a nuclear
device, he
was aware
that the AQ Khan network had placed Pakistani nuclear technology
into the
hands of a
number of states:
“I knew
that AQ Khan had been providing designs to North Korea, to
Libya.
I suppose
I would probably have assumed that if he could do a design, why
wouldn’t
he be
prepared to hand over a [key nuclear component] if he had
one?”187
433.
Mr Webb
told the Inquiry that his focus “was all about timescales”. In the
light
of the
advice that one year would be required to produce “a real nuclear
weapon, as
distinct
from a dirty bomb, and two to three years for a nuclear missile”,
he had informed
Mr Feith,
“I think you are overdoing this, but at a year-ish we are in the
same sort
of zone”.
434.
In his
discussions with President Bush, Mr Blair identified the need
for
a public
relations strategy which highlighted the risks posed by Iraq’s
WMD
programme.
435.
Mr Blair’s
meetings with President Bush at Crawford, Texas on 5 to 6 April,
and his
speech at
College Station on 7 April arguing for an internationalist approach
to dealing
with Iraq,
and the dangers of not doing so, are addressed in Section
3.2.
436.
In the
discussions with President Bush about a strategy of taking the
issue of Iraq
back to the
UN, Mr Blair identified the need for a public relations
strategy that highlighted
both the
risks of Saddam Hussein’s WMD programme and his “appalling”
human
rights
record, and the importance of managing European public opinion and
helping to
construct
an international coalition.188
437.
Mr Blair
said he would emphasise that Saddam Hussein was being given
an
opportunity
to co-operate. If “as he expected” Saddam failed to do so, it would
be “very
186
Private
hearing, 23 June 2010, pages 51-52.
187
Private
hearing, 23 June 2010, page 54.
188
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 8 April 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to the
United States: 5-7 April’.
92