3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
76.
Iraq
welcomed the US decision to act through the UN while emphasising
that
Iraq’s
“inalienable rights” should be met and members of the Security
Council
should meet
their obligations.
77.
A letter
from Saddam Hussein stated that Iraq was “totally clear of all
nuclear,
chemical
and biological weapons” and would accept inspections to “achieve,
with
transparency
the goal of making sure Iraq no longer possesses … weapons
of
mass
destruction”.
78.
In his speech
to the UN General Assembly on 19 September, Dr Sabri
offered
Iraq’s
“condolences to the American people, especially the families of the
victims”
of the 11 September
2001 attacks.22
79.
Dr Sabri
expressed “sincere gratitude” to states and organisations which
had
rejected US
threats against Iraq and called for “a comprehensive political
solution
to the
impasse in the relationship between Iraq and the Security Council”.
The Iraqi
Government’s
decision “to allow the return of UN weapons inspectors without
conditions
as a first
step towards a comprehensive solution” that included “the lifting
of sanctions
imposed on
Iraq and the timely implementation of other provisions of relevant
Security
Council
resolutions”, was a response to the appeals of Mr Annan and
others.
80.
Dr Sabri
told the Security Council that he had been instructed by Saddam
Hussein
to convey
excerpts from his letter to the General Assembly, which presented
“Iraq’s
position on
the latest developments in the relationship between Iraq and the
Security
Council”.
81.
Saddam Hussein
welcomed the US decision “for the first time since the end of
the
cold war”
to put one of its problems to the General Assembly “after years of
disregard
of the
weight, effect and opinion of others”. But the letter was critical
of American actions
on Iraq and
its support for Israel. It described President Bush’s speech on 12
September
as
presenting “extreme distortions of the so‑called nuclear,
biological, and chemical
threats”
posed by Iraq:
“… so as to
make American citizens believe the deliberate insinuation that Iraq
was
linked to
the American people’s tragedy of September 11.”
82.
Saddam
Hussein’s letter set out Iraq’s views on US actions and
statements,
including:
“So, after
utilizing the American propaganda machine for a long time and
spouting
official
statements full of lies, distortion, and falsehood, the focus was
basically
turned on
inciting the American public against Iraq and pushing it to believe
the
United
States Administration’s schemes of aggression as a fait accompli as
if it were
22
UN General
Assembly, ‘Fifty‑seventh session 19 September 2002’
(A/57/PV.17).
213