4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
144.
Mr Campbell
added that announcing the publication of the dossier would
“raise
expectations
massively. Today was about beginning to turn the tide of public
opinion and
it was
going to be very tough indeed.”
145.
The Inquiry
asked Mr Blair for a statement addressing whether, before his
press
conference
in Sedgefield, he had refreshed his memory in relation to the 15
March 2002
JIC
Assessment, ‘The Status of Iraqi WMD Programmes’.60
146.
In his
statement, Mr Blair wrote:
“The basis
for the statements I made on the issue of Saddam and WMD
were
based, of
course, on the JIC Assessments and on the whole history of
Saddam
and WMD
going back over many years, including his use of chemical weapons,
the
findings of
previous UN inspectors, his well documented attempts at
concealment.
“… [F]or my
press conference at Sedgefield … I requested and received a
special
briefing
from the FCO. I would probably also have re-read the JIC report
of
15 March
2002 and the list of unaccounted for items from the UNSCOM
reports.
I draw
attention to the first part of the [FCO] briefing of 2 September
2002, in
particular
to the reference that ‘we believe that Iraq has recently
accelerated its
weapons
programme’; ‘increased nuclear procurement’; and to the fact that
UN
inspectors
in 1998 ‘were unable to account for thousands of tonnes of
so-called
147.
As Section 4.1
sets out, the decision to produce a document for publication
setting
out the
facts on WMD in relation to countries of concern, including Iraq,
was taken in
mid-February
2002 and was briefed to the press shortly
thereafter.62
148.
Speculation
about the publication of a document on Iraq’s WMD and
its
significance
in relation to a decision about military action against Iraq had
continued
throughout
the spring and summer of 2002.
149.
On 16 July,
No.10 decided to put publication on hold and that further
decisions
would be
needed on its precise form.63
150.
On the same
day, Mr Blair had told the Liaison Committee that if policy on
Iraq
moved into
a new phase, a document would be published.64
60
Inquiry
request for a witness statement, 13 December 2010, Q3(a) page
2.
61
Statement,
14 January 2011, page 4.
62
The
Observer, 24
February 2002, Blair and
Bush to plot war on Iraq.
63
Minute
Manning to McKane, 16 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Public
Documents’.
64
Minutes,
Liaison Committee (House of Commons), 16 July 2002, [Evidence
Session], Q 87-88.
141