9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
589.
In discussion,
it was proposed that the UK should take a view on next
steps
in the
political process. Was it better to hold out for a strong
government, or have a
government
as quickly as possible? Ministers agreed that “we should establish
a clear
British
view on next steps in the political process”.
590.
In his weekly
report on 5 March, Lt Gen Houghton reflected on whether Iraq was
at
risk of
civil war:
“The
potential for civil war in Iraq does have to be thought through, if
only to plan
more
thoroughly to avert it. Assessments here indicate that the
underlying conditions
conducive
to civil war exist in Iraq now, but not yet at a level of severity
which makes
civil war
either imminent or inevitable. The main conditions … are:
ethno-sectarian
divisions;
high levels of violence; an erosion of central authority; and the
rise of
competing
centres of authority. Many of the underlying indicators which
presage
a move
towards civil war are becoming more evident. Specifically, there
has been
a change in
the character of the violence: it is now more sectarian and less
anti-
coalition.
There is some ethno-sectarian mobilisation of militias and some
minor
movement of
populations. The indicators are worrying.
“But the
innate resistance to civil war in Iraq is strong, as evidenced most
recently
by the
reaction to the destruction of the Golden Mosque in Samarra.
Whatever the
ultimate
statistics are for the extent of the subsequent sectarian violence,
it was
relatively
restrained, indicating the power of Shia religious leadership to
control
their
people in the interests of Iraq as a whole. Coalition presence
(military and
diplomatic)
also acts as a block against the underlying conditions becoming
more
acute. But,
given the planned and anticipated reductions in coalition
presence,
the
importance of sustaining central authority becomes ever clearer.
The current
government
is not … perceived as even-handed in security issues. Its
continuation
in power
makes civil war more likely. I therefore see the early seating of a
strong,
representative,
national government as vital.” 287
591.
On 7 March,
Mr Blair told President Bush that in forming the new
government it
was
important to get the balance right between speed and
quality.288
He
suggested that it
was
important to try and secure a new government that month, and then
for the US and
UK to
support it and explain that it really was a national unity
government.
592.
On 9 March,
Mr Straw’s Private Secretary reported to Sir Nigel Sheinwald
that
the focus
on Sunni outreach was on Anbar province, where work was in hand to
bring
up levels
of Sunni participation in the police and the army, and significant
releases of
detainees
were planned.289
287
Minute
Houghton to CDS, 5 March 2006, ‘SBMR-I Weekly Report (201) 5 March
06’.
288
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 7 March 2006, ‘VTC with President Bush: Middle
East issues’.
289
Letter
Siddiq to Sheinwald, 9 March 2006, ‘Iraq: Sunni
Outreach’.
587