The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Phase IV,
the UK was adopting a twin track approach: the FCO and Cabinet
Office
were
leading the top-down strand, and PJHQ was leading the bottom up
effort. The
challenge
which lay ahead was matching the two pieces of work … The UK
concept
at the
strategic level was to develop a model that could be offered to the
US. It was
assessed
that the US was still working to an unrealistic assumption that
their forces
would be
‘welcomed with open arms’ by the Iraqi people during Phase IV
operations,
and there
was an opportunity for the UK to lead the aftermath
debate.”
103.
Major General
Robert Fry, Deputy Chief of Joint Operations
(Operations)
(DCJO(O)),
gave the Chiefs of Staff an oral update on the land package and
plan,
air basing
options and targeting issues.26
104.
The Chiefs of
Staff were told that the plan would not be finalised until
after
Major
General Robin Brims, General Officer Commanding (GOC) 1 (UK) Div,
had met
US
commanders, which was likely to be at the end of January. They
agreed that the
“specified”
tasks would be “uncontentious and achievable”.
105.
The Chiefs of
Staff also noted that the UK AO “was a disproportionately
important
piece of
real estate”.
106.
In his report
to Sir David Manning, Mr Bowen stated that the meeting
had
discussed
the current state of planning “at length”.27
He wrote
that the tasks for the
UK forces
were:
•
The initial
“clearance” of the al-Faw Peninsula and the “opening” of Umm
Qasr
port.
•
16 Air
Assault Brigade and 7 Armoured Brigade would then secure the
allocated
area of
responsibility.
•
The
“capture” of Basra “was not part of the Division’s
task”.
•
The “weight
of the initial air attack would be designed to shock the
Iraqi
leadership
and military into submission” and the campaign was “meant
to
achieve
quick results”.
•
The UK was
expected to be responsible for its area within five days from
the
start of
ground operations.
107.
Mr Johnston
reported to Mr Straw that the MOD would seek approval
from
Ministers
and Mr Blair later that week.28
He
wrote:
“… there
would be heavy impact bombing from day one … regime targets …
would,
feature
early in the campaign. This was designed to achieve regime collapse
as
quickly and
painlessly as possible … the Chiefs recognised that there would
be
presentational
and legal issues. Further work is being urgently done on this
…”
26
Minutes, 15
January 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
27
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Chiefs of Staff Meeting
on 15 January’.
28
Minute
Johnston to Private Secretary [FCO], 15 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Chiefs
of Staff: 15 January’.
402