4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
121.
Following
the 9/11 attacks, the JIC assessed on 18 September that they
had
set a new
benchmark for terrorist atrocity, and that terrorists seeking
comparable
impact
might seek to use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear
devices.
But only
Islamic extremists such as those who shared Usama Bin Laden’s
agenda
had the
motivation to pursue attacks with the deliberate aim of causing
maximum
casualties.
122.
The
potential threat to UK interests would be higher the more closely
the UK
was
identified with the US.
123.
Following a
request from Mr Blair for a reassessment of the nature and
scale of the
threat
posed to the UK by terrorism and the contingency plans for dealing
with it, the JIC
considered
whether the scale and nature of the terrorist threat to the UK had
changed.66
124.
The key points
made in discussion included:
•
The attacks
“marked a step change” and: “What had before been only
an
assessed
possibility had now become a fact. A new benchmark had been
set,
and there
could be no going back to the status quo ante.”
•
“Even if
the component parts of those attacks had not been wholly new,
their
sheer
audacity, scale, co-ordination and ambition were
novel.”
•
“The
terrorists with creativity and imagination would look for other
ways to
make as
much impact. The draft [Assessment] needed to say more about
the
threat from
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism, which
it
underplayed.”
•
“The paper
needed to include some blue-sky thinking about what the
future
might hold,
but to maintain a sense of proportion.”
125.
Mr Scarlett
concluded that “the draft needed reworking, in terms of both of
its
structure
and framework, and of its detail”. A revised version would be
circulated for
further
comment.
126.
The
Assessment, issued on 18 September, considered whether the attacks
of
11
September changed the nature and scale of the terrorist threat to
the UK, and the
UK’s
potential vulnerability to major terrorist attack, and “the current
and immediately
foreseeable
threat in terms of the intention and capability of known terrorist
groups”.67
The
Assessment assumed that there would be “a continuation of the
current political
circumstances
in which the UK is closely identified with the US”.
66
Minutes, 14
September 2001, JIC meeting. As a Director in the Treasury Public
Services Directorate
responsible
for the Defence, Diplomacy and Intelligence Team, Ms Margaret
Aldred, the Secretary to the
Inquiry,
was present at the discussion.
67
JIC
Assessment, 18 September 2001, ‘UK Vulnerability to Major Terrorist
Attack’.
37