The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
priorities.
The ability to deploy quickly is also essential: ideally, we want
the first
volunteers
to reach Baghdad on around 5 May, to allow them to shape ORHA’s
work
and
approach from the start …
“In all
cases, enthusiasm and personal qualities are likely to be just as
important as
specific
expertise.”
259.
The IPU list
attached to Sir Michael’s letter drew heavily on Maj Gen Cross’
earlier
“must/should/could”
list, but incorporated a number of changes including:
•
upgrading
the Oil Ministry to “must fill”, citing UK commercial interests and
the
presence of
major Iraqi oil installations in the UK’s AOR; and
•
upgrading
infrastructure ministries to “must fill”, citing the
“important
commercial dimension”.
260.
The IPU list
only considered ORHA’s work to strengthen Iraqi ministries. It
did
not
identify staffing requirements for ORHA’s regional offices or for
ORHA’s senior
management
team. Maj Gen Cross had listed UK support for ORHA regional offices
as
“must
fill”, the provision of a UK civilian to lead an ORHA regional
office as a “should
fill”, and
had identified a senior individual to join Garner’s senior
management team as
a “must
fill”.
261.
On the same
day as Sir Michael Jay’s request for volunteers, Ms Short’s
Private
Office sent
Mr Malik’s report on his visit to ORHA in Kuwait to No.10, the
Cabinet
Secretary,
the Cabinet Office, the FCO, the MOD, the Treasury, DFID, the DTI
and the
Attorney
General’s Office.152
262.
Mr Malik’s
report stated that ORHA was “simply not prepared” to meet
the
immediate
recovery needs in Iraq; those would need to be addressed by the
military
and,
security permitting, by UN agencies and NGOs.
263.
Mr Malik
assessed that ORHA was more focused on longer-term
reconstruction
and reform.
A number of large USAID contracts had been let, and there was
“some
good
thinking” in a number of reform areas, but it remained to be seen
whether ORHA’s
plans and
contracts were flexible enough to respond to conditions on the
ground.
ORHA’s
teams and pillars were not well co-ordinated and there was “little
sense of
a unifying
strategy”.
264.
ORHA’s plans
for reconstruction and civil administration were broad and
not
obviously
limited to those of an Occupying Power; UK collaboration would
therefore
require
further legal advice.
152
Letter DFID
[junior official] to Rycroft, 22 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Engagement with
ORHA’ attaching Paper
DFID
Humanitarian Response and Coordination Team, 22 April 2003, ‘Iraq:
ORHA – Visit Report’.
50