The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
293.
In relation to
the policy the questions included:
•
Mr Peter
Bradley (Labour) asked Mr Blair which was the lesser evil,
allowing
more time
for disarmament or dividing the international community
“particularly
in view of
the French President’s commitment to exercise his veto”. He
also
asked for
an assurance that he would resist US pressure while there was
a
prospect of
rebuilding the international coalition under the authority of the
UN.
•
Mr Iain
Duncan Smith, Leader of the Opposition, asked whether there would
be
a vote in
the UN and whether the US would go to war without the UK if
there
was no
second resolution.
•
Mr Barry
Sheerman (Labour) asked Mr Blair to use all his efforts to
tell President
Bush that
we needed another UN resolution and that there was “no need for
an
unseemly
haste to war”.
294.
The points
made by Mr Blair included:
•
He was
doing “everything” he could “to make sure that the
international
community
stays united and that we achieve a second resolution”.
•
Although he
had not complied for “many months”, there was still time
for
Saddam
Hussein to avert conflict.
•
The “worst
thing that could happen” was for Saddam Hussein to defy the
clearly
expressed
will of the UN and for no action to follow.
•
It was the
Government’s intention to seek a UN vote on a second
resolution
“in a way
that most upholds the authority of the UN”.
•
The UK
“should not take military action unless it is in our interests to
do so.
It is the
British national interest that must be upheld at all
times.”
•
In working
“flat out” for a second resolution, Mr Blair said the UK was
“looking
at whether
we can set out a clear set of tests for Iraq … to demonstrate that
it is
still in
compliance – not partial compliance …”
•
“… not one
Iraqi scientist has been interviewed outside Iraq”.
•
“Iraq
should produce the unmanned aerial vehicles, which can spray
chemical
and
biological poison …”
•
“If we set
out those conditions clearly, and back them with a will of a united
UN,
we have a
chance even now of averting conflict. What we must show,
however,
is the
determination to act if Saddam will not comply fully.”
•
Military
action had been “delayed precisely in order to bring the
international
community
back round the position … set out in 1441”.
•
The “heart
of the agreement” of the US “to take the multilateral path of
the
United
Nations” was that the “other partners inside the United Nations
agreed
that, if
Saddam did not fully comply and was in material breach,
serious
consequences
and actions would follow”.
•
It would
“be a tragedy for the UN” if it failed “to meet the
challenge”.
450