9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
148.
Mr Browne’s
statement was published when Parliament returned on 11
September.
It
confirmed an uplift of 360 personnel and went on to
say:
“This is a
critical period for the Iraqi people and their Government. There is
an
opportunity
to improve significantly the security situation in Basra City –
building
on, and
reinforcing, recent progress in Baghdad. Improved security in Basra
will
create the
conditions for the important civil development work being led by
the UK’s
Provincial
Reconstruction Team. Therefore I have agreed that the deployment
of
troops from
the Theatre Reserve Battalion, while strictly time limited, should
on this
occasion be
brought forward and extended by a short period. In addition, I
have
also
authorised the deployment of Royal Engineers to assist with
reconstruction and
countering
the threat from improvised explosive devices, a Royal Marine boat
troop
to assist
in tightening security on the Shatt Al Arab waterway, and a troop
of Royal
Military
Police to augment our training of the Iraqi Police.
“We ask our
servicemen and women to discharge difficult and dangerous
tasks.
But over
the next few months, through security operations and civil
development
projects,
we have a key opportunity to make improvements to the lives of the
people
of Basra
and lay the foundations for the departure, once the conditions are
right, of
coalition
forces from front line roles in Iraq.”103
149.
Lt Gen Fry’s
successor, Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, took up post
as
SBMR‑I in
early September. He had previously served as the first GOC
MND(SE)
in 2003
(see Section 9.2).
150.
In his first
weekly report, Lt Gen Lamb said Iraq was “damaged not broken” and
he
was
“cautiously optimistic”.104
He
considered it necessary to recalibrate UK
expectations:
“The
[Iraqi] Government is woefully immature in governance (albeit a
UK
Government
would be in a pretty challenging position to achieve the same
results
that the
coalition is demanding from Maliki) but the individuals are
sophisticated
manipulators
of people, ideas, facts and are ultimately this country’s future
…
“The
Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) appears to remain on track, albeit
early days
yet …
Too soon to elaborate but two early observations on the military
piece:
a.
Sadr
City. The
timing of the entry to Sadr City has yet to be finalised, but
the
sense is
that without it the BSP falls short of a meaningful conclusion …
rogue
elements of
the Sadr movement (not necessarily Sadr himself) are in my
view
a ‘clear
and present danger’ to this nation and reconciliation.
b.
Non‑security
Elements.
Co‑ordination of the Iraqi ministries to deliver the
non‑security
elements that need to follow seamlessly from the MNC‑I
activity
is
occasional, and on face value lacklustre. The work of my
predecessors has
103
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 11
September 2006, column 111WS.
104
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 10 September 2006, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (226) 10 Sep
06’.
31