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9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007
148.  Mr Browne’s statement was published when Parliament returned on 11 September.
It confirmed an uplift of 360 personnel and went on to say:
“This is a critical period for the Iraqi people and their Government. There is an
opportunity to improve significantly the security situation in Basra City – building
on, and reinforcing, recent progress in Baghdad. Improved security in Basra will
create the conditions for the important civil development work being led by the UK’s
Provincial Reconstruction Team. Therefore I have agreed that the deployment of
troops from the Theatre Reserve Battalion, while strictly time limited, should on this
occasion be brought forward and extended by a short period. In addition, I have
also authorised the deployment of Royal Engineers to assist with reconstruction and
countering the threat from improvised explosive devices, a Royal Marine boat troop
to assist in tightening security on the Shatt Al Arab waterway, and a troop of Royal
Military Police to augment our training of the Iraqi Police.
“We ask our servicemen and women to discharge difficult and dangerous tasks.
But over the next few months, through security operations and civil development
projects, we have a key opportunity to make improvements to the lives of the people
of Basra and lay the foundations for the departure, once the conditions are right, of
coalition forces from front line roles in Iraq.”103
149.  Lt Gen Fry’s successor, Lieutenant General Graeme Lamb, took up post as
SBMR‑I in early September. He had previously served as the first GOC MND(SE)
in 2003 (see Section 9.2).
150.  In his first weekly report, Lt Gen Lamb said Iraq was “damaged not broken” and he
was “cautiously optimistic”.104 He considered it necessary to recalibrate UK expectations:
“The [Iraqi] Government is woefully immature in governance (albeit a UK
Government would be in a pretty challenging position to achieve the same results
that the coalition is demanding from Maliki) but the individuals are sophisticated
manipulators of people, ideas, facts and are ultimately this country’s future …
“The Baghdad Security Plan (BSP) appears to remain on track, albeit early days
yet … Too soon to elaborate but two early observations on the military piece:
a. Sadr City. The timing of the entry to Sadr City has yet to be finalised, but the
sense is that without it the BSP falls short of a meaningful conclusion … rogue
elements of the Sadr movement (not necessarily Sadr himself) are in my view
a ‘clear and present danger’ to this nation and reconciliation.
b. Non‑security Elements. Co‑ordination of the Iraqi ministries to deliver the
non‑security elements that need to follow seamlessly from the MNC‑I activity
is occasional, and on face value lacklustre. The work of my predecessors has
103  House of Commons, Official Report, 11 September 2006, column 111WS.
104  Minute Lamb to CDS, 10 September 2006, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (226) 10 Sep 06’.
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