The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• The engine test facility being constructed at al-Rafah would “be capable of

testing engines” with ranges over 1,000km and “would not be needed” for

systems within the 150km permitted range.

• Iraq had “managed to rebuild much of the missile production infrastructure”

destroyed in 1991 and 1998 and new missile-related infrastructure was “under

construction”.

• “Despite a UN embargo, Iraq has also made concerted efforts to acquire

additional production technology …”316

FUNDING FOR THE WMD PROGRAMME

587.  The Executive Summary of the dossier stated that Iraq had an illegal income

of some US$3bn from “illicit earnings generated outside UN control”.317

588.  The dossier acknowledged that the proportion of those funds that was used

to develop or acquire military equipment was unknown, but stated:

“… we have seen no evidence that Iraqi attempts to develop its weapons of mass

destruction and its ballistic missile programme … has been inhibited in any way by

lack of funds. The steady increase [in illicit funds] over the last three years in the

availability of funds will enable Saddam to progress the programmes faster.”

Questions about the judgements in the dossier

589.  The judgements expressed in the dossier and how they were reached have

already been examined by the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Intelligence and

Security Committee (ISC) and Inquiries led by Lord Hutton and Lord Butler.

590.  The report of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (FAC), The

Decision to go to War in Iraq (HC 813-1), was published on 7 July 2003.318 It sought

to “establish whether the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), within the

Government as a whole, presented accurate and complete information to Parliament

in the period leading up to military action in Iraq, particularly in respect of weapons of

mass destruction”.

591.  The report of the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), Iraqi Weapons

of Mass Destruction – Intelligence and Assessments (Cm 5972), was published in

316  Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government, 24 September 2002,

pages 27-30.

317  Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government, 24 September 2002,

page 7.

318  Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-2003, The Decision to go to War in

Iraq, HC 813-1.

226