9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
inconvenient
nihilistic activities that weren’t really an overarching threat to
security …
there were
some particularly frustrating [issues], not least the propensity
for people
to want to
pull down the power cables so they could smelt the cables into
copper
ingots and
sell them.” 227
353.
Gen Wall told
the Inquiry that it was nonetheless possible for UK
troops:
“ … to get
out and about and interact with people, and the people on the
street
would tell
you that if you could be part of a military force that could bring
about the
end of this
regime, then it was but a few days’ work to sort out the rest of
the issues
in a place
like Basra. Such was the relief.”228
354.
In New York,
the Security Council discussed a revised draft on 15
May.229
Sir Jeremy
observed that “many of the same problems remain”. The focus of
discussion
was again
on strengthening the role of the UN Special Co-ordinator, as well
on the need
for UNMOVIC
and on the legal position of countries assisting the Occupying
Powers.
355.
Cabinet Office
officials reported to the AHMGIR on 15 May that initial
discussions
of the new
resolution in the Security Council had been as positive as could
be
expected.230
The
UK/US/Spanish draft text was not as contentious as the
‘Second
Resolution’,
and Ministers were advised that the UK should press the US to be
patient
while the
Security Council deliberated, while encouraging other Council
members to
seize the
opportunity to re-engage the UN in Iraq.
356.
Concerns had
focused on a need for clarity in three areas:
•
The extent
of the UN role and how the Special Co-ordinator would interact
with
the
Coalition and IIA.
•
The
political process, in particular the exact nature of the IIA:
whether it would
be a
transitional government and, if not, when and how it would become
one.
•
Arrangements
for oversight of oil sales and disbursement of oil revenue, as
well
as the fate
of existing contracts under the OFF programme.
It was also
reported that the US wanted the resolution to be adopted by 22 May,
as
this was
the date by which they wished to start exporting oil to avoid a
lack of storage
capacity
affecting production and so the local supply of gas and
petrol.
357.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told the Inquiry that:
“The other
members of the Security Council were more constructive than I
was
expecting
at this stage, I think for one, perhaps two, overwhelming reasons.
One was
that they
wanted the United Nations to come back into the picture. They
wanted the
unilateralism
of what they saw as having happened in the invasion to be
corrected
227
Public
hearing, 14 December 2009, pages 46-47.
228
Public
hearing, 14 December 2009, page 47.
229
Telegram
841 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 16 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Discussions
on the Resolution’.
230 Annotated
Agenda, 15 May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
193