3.6 | Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003

he did not believe Saddam would ever comply, or that the inspectors would be allowed

to do their job”.226

673. The record of the discussion confirms Mr Campbell’s account.227

674. In response to a question from Mr Campbell about whether he thought President

Bush “had basically decided there was going to be a war,” Mr Blair had said “if that call

was anything to go by, pretty much”, Mr Blair hoped that “he could keep things on a

multilateral track but it was not going to be easy. He was facing a very tough call indeed,

about as tough as they get.”228

675. Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Blair “was confident that we could get Bush to the

position where he stayed [action] long enough for a second UNSCR”; and that there

was also “a real danger that the Attorney General would resign if he thought the plan

was disproportionate force”.

676. Mr Campbell reported that Mr Blair had told a political Cabinet on 24 January that

“it was important to stay with the Americans”. He had emphasised “closeness as a way

of influencing the debate there” and said “he wanted to do a big … diplomacy round”

before his meeting with President Bush. Mr Blair had also:

“… set out what he saw as the political and other realities. He felt that Bush

deserved praise for showing strength in forcing Saddam to the position of getting

the inspectors in, but … we didn’t have enough international support and we needed

time to build it.”

677. Describing the political Cabinet on 24 January, Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Prescott

had said more Cabinet Committee discussion on policy was needed.

678. In a conversation with Mr de Villepin on 24 January, Mr Straw said that it was

“important for everyone to keep to the process” set out in resolution 1441.229 That was

“the guide against which we could test whether the inspectors had been able to do their

job or not”. He restated the UK’s preference for a second resolution.

679. Mr Straw said that “how France played its hand had major consequences”. It was

vital to take the UN route. Citing the League of Nations in the 1930s, he said that “failure

by the UN would lead to questions about its legitimacy”. After complaining about the

US approach, Mr de Villepin stated that if in the end it was decided force was needed,

“France would join in”.

226 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

227 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 27 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President Bush,

24 January’.

228 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown

to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.

229 Telegram 16 FCO London to Paris, ‘Iraq: Foreign Secretary’s Conversation with French Foreign

Minister, 24 January’.

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