3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
is to be
avoided. If any addressees were intending to comment, grateful if
this could
be in the
form of personal letters to the PUS only.
“We will of
course give guidance for Posts on Iraq issues as and when we
can.”37
114.
In preparation
for a meeting with Mr Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, in
London
on 25
February, the FCO advised Mr Blair that Mr Amre Moussa, Secretary
General of
the Arab
League, had conveyed an “offer” from President Saddam Hussein to Mr
Annan
“to re-open
dialogue, without pre-conditions, on co-operation with the
UN”.38
The
FCO
added that
it was “not clear whether Saddam would under any circumstances
allow
the return
of the inspectors” or whether it was “simply a propaganda
exercise”. History
“would
suggest the latter”.
115.
Mr Annan had
responded that:
•
He was
always willing to talk to any [UN] Member State about complying
with
UN
resolutions.
•
Any renewed
dialogue should be more focused and substantive than
before,
and set in
the context of implementing the relevant resolutions, including
getting
the
inspectors back in.
116.
Mr Blair was
advised to make a number of points to Mr Annan,
including:
•
Congratulating
Mr Annan on his response to Saddam Hussein’s offer.
•
The Iraqi
regime’s support for terrorism and development of WMD was “of
the
utmost
concern” to the international community. Saddam’s “WMD
ambitions”
would not
be allowed to “go unchecked”.
•
The UK
believed getting inspectors back into Iraq was the “best way to
eliminate
WMD”.
•
Getting
them in on Saddam Hussein’s terms was “not an option”: the UK
was
looking for
“an effective inspections regime as specified in … resolutions
687
and 1284,
not false assurances”.
•
The Iraqi
regime had to be “brought to realise that if it continues to reject
its UN
obligations
to disarm then military action to deal with the threat it poses
becomes
more
likely. We collectively share responsibility for ensuring this
message gets
across.”
117.
In their
meeting, Mr Blair told Mr Annan that WMD were “the key” for the
next
phase of
the response to terrorism, “particularly acquisition by states that
were not
37
Telegram 32
FCO London to Cairo, 22 February 2002, ‘Iraq’.
38
Letter
McDonald to Tatham, 21 February 2002, ‘Kofi Annan’s Call on the
Prime Minister,
Monday 25 February’.
407