The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
429.
Mr Brenton
subsequently reported on 6 March that the US “had also
gained
the
impression that we need the resolution for legal reasons: I
explained the real
430.
Asked by the
Inquiry what he had understood “the real situation” to
be,
Mr Brenton
said that Lord Goldsmith had not told him anything, but he had sat
in on
Lord Goldsmith’s
conversations with the US Attorney General and “got the
impression
from him
[Lord Goldsmith] that there was a legal case for our involvement,
even if we
didn’t get
the second resolution”.170
431.
Ms Adams
produced a revised draft for Lord Goldsmith on 12 February, which
for
the first
time concluded:
“… having
regard to the arguments of our co-sponsors which I heard in
Washington,
I am
prepared to accept that a reasonable case can be made that
resolution 1441
revives the
authorisation to use force in resolution 678.”171
432.
Following
discussion between Mr Blair and President Bush on
19 February,
the UK
agreed a “light draft resolution” with the US.
433.
Lord
Goldsmith subsequently advised that draft would be
“sufficient”
to authorise
the use of force if it was all that would be
negotiable.
434.
Lord
Goldsmith did not, however, accept the underpinning legal
analysis
offered by
Sir Jeremy Greenstock.
435.
Reflecting the
seriousness of his concerns about the implications of
recent
developments,
Mr Blair sent President Bush a Note on 19 February about the
need for a
second
resolution (see Section 3.7).
436.
Mr Blair
proposed focusing on the absence of full co-operation and
a
“simple” resolution
stating that Iraq had failed to take the final
opportunity,
with a side statement
defining tough tests of co-operation and a vote on 14
March
to provide
a deadline for action.
437.
Sir Jeremy
gave Ambassador John Negroponte, US Permanent
Representative
to the
UN, a revised “light draft resolution” on 19 February
which:
•
noted
[draft preambular paragraph (PP) 5] that Iraq had “submitted a
declaration
…
containing false statements and omissions and has failed to comply
with and
co‑operate
fully in the implementation of that resolution [1441]”;
and
169
Telegram
294 Washington to FCO London, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UN
Endgame’.
170
Private
hearing, 17 January 2011, pages 25-26.
171
Note
[draft] Adams, 12 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Interpretation of
1441’.
78