The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“Bremer was
a centraliser – good at taking quick decisions, but there was a
risk of
reduced
consultation.”
137.
Mr Annan
also warned that:
“…
de-Ba’athification had gone too deep, since for most Iraqis it was
Saddam, not
Iraq, who
had been defeated. We should find a way to reemploy many more
former
policemen,
as the UN had done in Bosnia.”
138.
Mr Blair
said that de-Ba’thification needed to be implemented “pragmatically
and
flexibly”
and that he would continue to raise the issue with President
Bush.
139.
The AHMGIR met
again on 26 June.54
The Annotated
Agenda for the meeting,
prepared by
the Cabinet Office, stated that “the Iraqi
Interim Administration will be
composed of
a number of elements, including a Political Council, a
Constitutional
Convention
and reform Commissions”. It reported positive progress on
appointing the
Council,
but that “finding the right women remains a
challenge”.
140.
Cabinet Office
officials recorded that Ambassador Bremer:
•
intended
the Political Council to exercise increasing powers over time: its
two
immediate
tasks would be to propose ministers, and to advise the Coalition
on
long-term
issues such as regulation of political parties, and educational
and
judicial
reforms;
•
had given
an undertaking that, once the Interim Administration was formed,
the
CPA would
not take any major decisions without consulting it;
and
•
remained
keen to establish a Constitutional Conference by the end of July,
but
Iraqi
participants in the consultation process were undecided whether
this should
be elected
or appointed, and how.
141.
The Annotated
Agenda said that the UN remained closely involved. The UK
was
trying to
involve the UN in other aspects of the democratic process, such as
holding a
census and
drawing up an electoral register.
142.
The AHMGIR was
given a draft of the CPA’s Strategic Plan which the
Cabinet
Office
described as “a good basis for further work” but “still deficient”
and “not in
a form
digestible to Iraqi and regional audiences”. It included the CPA’s
planning
assumptions that:
“– Iraqi
people will accept the legitimacy of the Interim
Administration.
–– The
election of an accountable and representative government will be
based
upon a
Constitution borne [sic] of a popular participative
process.
54 Annotated
Agenda, 26 June 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting
attaching ‘OCPA
Strategic
Plan’.
228