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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
needed to isolate the militants from the majority of militiamen who are only there
because the militia can pay them. Thus the enemy, militant JAM and the death
squads linked to the Basra police … are able to operate with relative impunity …
“In my view, the only way we will achieve mission success is by winning the battle
for Basra and defeating militant JAM and the death squads (whether by capturing,
or, if necessary, by killing them in accordance with our ROE (Rules of Engagement)).
But we must be clever about it. A blunt, solely kinetic approach risks getting sucked
into a series of running tactical battles against JAM that will get us nowhere. We
must isolate militant JAM from mainstream JAM and build the intelligence picture in
order to target them and the death squads connected to the police in Basra. The key
to this is energetic and sustained effort along the governance and economic lines of
operation, both of which remain inadequate … (the comprehensive approach did not
exist). Progress on these lines is essential to create and maintain tolerance for our
operations in Basra. It will also underwrite success on the security line of operation.
There has been plenty of planning but we need to make things happen.”
1223.  In his evidence to the Inquiry, Lt Gen Sir Richard Shirreff described a “cycle of
insecurity” as he further explained why achieving security was his first objective:
“No security meant no reconstruction and development, it meant a loss of consent,
the militia filled the gap and, effectively, the militia controlled the city.”1145
Provincial Iraqi Control
Transferring responsibility from the coalition to the Iraqi Government of each of the
18 Iraqi provinces was referred to as reaching Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC). PIC was
granted following an assessment by the coalition and the Iraqi Government.
Transitional Readiness Assessment
A Transitional Readiness Assessment (TRA) level was used to rank Iraqi units in terms of
their capability, from TRA level 1 (fully capable) to TRA level 4 (incapable).
The Joint Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (see Box ‘Assessing readiness for
Provincial Iraqi Control’) judged that at TRA level 2, the IPS could maintain domestic order
and prevent the resurgence of terrorism.1146
1224.  In his weekly report, Maj Gen Shirreff said that he had had some encouraging
discussions about his proposed approach with Major General Muhammed Latif, the
Commander of 10th Division, based in Basra.1147 However, it would be fundamental to
ensure that there was political will in Baghdad behind any operation. Maj Gen Shirreff
1145  Public hearing, 11 January 2010, page 4.
1146  Paper Republic of Iraq National Security Council, 10 October 2005, Joint Committee to Transfer
Security Responsibility.
1147  Minute Shirreff, 21 July 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 21 July 2006’.
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