The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
needed to
isolate the militants from the majority of militiamen who are only
there
because the
militia can pay them. Thus the enemy, militant JAM and the
death
squads
linked to the Basra police … are able to operate with relative
impunity …
“In my
view, the only way we will achieve mission success is by winning
the battle
for Basra
and defeating militant JAM and the death squads (whether by
capturing,
or, if
necessary, by killing them in accordance with our ROE (Rules of
Engagement)).
But we must
be clever about it. A blunt, solely kinetic approach risks getting
sucked
into a
series of running tactical battles against JAM that will get us
nowhere. We
must
isolate militant JAM from mainstream JAM and build the intelligence
picture in
order to
target them and the death squads connected to the police in Basra.
The key
to this is
energetic and sustained effort along the governance and economic
lines of
operation,
both of which remain inadequate … (the comprehensive approach did
not
exist).
Progress on these lines is essential to create and maintain
tolerance for our
operations
in Basra. It will also underwrite success on the security line of
operation.
There has
been plenty of planning but we need to make things
happen.”
1223.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lt Gen Sir Richard Shirreff
described a “cycle of
insecurity”
as he further explained why achieving security was his first
objective:
“No
security meant no reconstruction and development, it meant a loss
of consent,
the militia
filled the gap and, effectively, the militia controlled the
city.”1145
Transferring
responsibility from the coalition to the Iraqi Government of each
of the
18 Iraqi
provinces was referred to as reaching Provincial Iraqi Control
(PIC). PIC was
granted
following an assessment by the coalition and the Iraqi
Government.
Transitional
Readiness Assessment
A
Transitional Readiness Assessment (TRA) level was used to rank
Iraqi units in terms of
their
capability, from TRA level 1 (fully capable) to TRA level 4
(incapable).
The Joint
Committee to Transfer Security Responsibility (see Box ‘Assessing
readiness for
Provincial
Iraqi Control’) judged that at TRA level 2, the IPS could maintain
domestic order
and prevent
the resurgence of terrorism.1146
1224.
In his weekly
report, Maj Gen Shirreff said that he had had some
encouraging
discussions
about his proposed approach with Major General Muhammed Latif,
the
Commander
of 10th Division, based in Basra.1147
However, it
would be fundamental to
ensure that
there was political will in Baghdad behind any operation.
Maj Gen Shirreff
1145
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 4.
1146
Paper
Republic of Iraq National Security Council, 10 October 2005, Joint
Committee to Transfer
Security
Responsibility.
1147
Minute
Shirreff, 21 July 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 21
July 2006’.
340