The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
529.
Evidence seen
by the Inquiry confirms that in January and February the
UK
stepped up
its efforts to encourage the Iraqis to form a broad and inclusive
government
of national
unity through high-level visits and rounds of phone
calls.251
530.
On 17 January,
Dr Roger Hutton, MOD Director Joint Commitments
Policy,
provided Dr
Reid with advice on the timing and detail of the deployment of UK
forces to
531.
Dr Hutton
advised that the Chiefs of Staff recommended the
immediate
deployment
of the full Helmand Task Force (HTF), and that they believed the
three
conditions
for this set by Dr Reid had now been satisfied; there was a
coherent UK
force
posture in Helmand; there was a coherent NATO force posture for
Afghanistan;
and other
UK government departments were prepared to engage in a coherent
cross-
departmental
effort in Helmand.
532.
The Chiefs of
Staff’s recommendation was “also crucially dependent” on
fulfilling
three
criteria, including:
“Achievability
within current UK commitments. The HTF,
taken together with the HQ
ARRC
[Allied Rapid Reaction Corps] deployment, calls on a variety of
capabilities,
and a
lengthy and complex logistic tail. With the continued commitment to
Iraq
through
2006, this presents significant but manageable challenges,
particularly for
logistic
enablers (including air transport). During this period we will
still be able to
undertake
immediate contingency operations, but on a limited
basis.”
533.
The advice was
considered by a group of Ministers and officials, known
colloquially
as the
“Reid Group”, on 18 January, and they agreed to recommend that the
UK proceed
with the
immediate deployment of the full HTF.
534.
Dr Reid wrote
to Mr Blair the following day, to say that the Ad Hoc
Ministerial Group
recommended
to Cabinet that the UK should proceed with a full deployment of the
HTF
to
Afghanistan.253
Dr Reid
would be seeking a discussion and decision at Cabinet
on
26 January.
535.
Dr Reid’s
letter recalled the assurances he had been given, including that
“UK
forces can
meet the planned level of commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan,
though
some
capabilities will be tight”. He recognised that Mr Browne was
“disappointed” at the
anticipated
additional call on the Reserve, but explained:
“I have
assured him that we will look at how the changing complexion of
our
operations
in Iraq and the Balkans might, with the agreement of Other
Government
251
eGram
359/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 9 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Visit by
Foreign Secretary, 6-7 January
2006:
Elections and Formatio[n]’; eGram 3684/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 22
February 2006, ‘Iraq:
Foreign
Secretary’s visit, 20-21 February 2006: Formation of Govern[ment]’;
Minute Bayley to Foreign
Secretary,
16 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Keeping up the Momentum – Proposed
Telephone Calls/Visit’.
252
Minute
Hutton to APS/SofS [MOD], 17 January 2006, ‘Afghanistan
Deployments’.
253
Letter Reid
to Blair, 19 January 2006, [untitled].
578