6.4 | Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003

even greater burden than war-fighting per se.”305 The 25 September instruction to

Lt Gen Pigott to “Explore options for potential UK involvement in Phase IV”, remained

on the list of “actions arising” attached to the minutes of the 2 October meeting, with an

extended deadline of 16 October.

574. Lord Boyce told the Inquiry he doubted there had been very many Chiefs of Staff

meetings where Phase IV had not been discussed:

“… half of most meetings was on Phase IV or half of the meetings about Iraq would

be spent talking about Phase IV.”306

575. More material on Phase IV was added to the 6 November edition of the SPG

paper, described later in this Section.

576. The proposal for an FCO/DFID/MOD framework plan was not acted upon until late

January 2003 (see Section 6.5).

577. A JIC Assessment on 10 October judged that US-led military action against

Iraq would motivate extremist groups and individuals to carry out terrorist attacks

against Coalition targets.

578. On 10 October, at the FCO’s request, the JIC assessed the terrorist threat from

Iraq in the event of US-led military action or imminent military action.307 The Assessment

made no explicit reference to terrorist attacks against Coalition targets in Iraq, other than

by Saddam Hussein during conflict, but stated:

“US-led military action against Iraq will motivate other [non-Iraqi] Islamic extremist

groups and individuals to carry out terrorist attacks against Coalition targets.

Al Qaida will use a Coalition attack on Iraq as further ‘justification’ for terrorist

attacks against Western or Israeli interests …

“A number of anti-West terrorist groups exploited the situation during the 1991

Gulf War … Such attacks could be conducted again, by individuals and groups

unconnected with Iraq. This may be exacerbated by weaker international support

for Coalition action compared to 1991.

“We judge that the greatest terrorist threat in the event of military action

against Iraq will come from Al Qaida and other Islamic extremists, but they will

be pursuing their own agendas, not responding to direction from Iraq. In the longer

term, a Coalition attack may radicalise increasing numbers of Muslims, especially

Arabs, and boost support and recruitment for extremist groups.”

305 Minutes, 2 October 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

306 Public hearing, 27 January 2011, page 81.

307 JIC Assessment, 10 October 2002, ‘International Terrorism: The Threat from Iraq’.

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