The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
the
assumption that the UK military would remain welcome in Iraq;
and
•
lack of
clarity on medium- and long-term objectives.
100.
PJHQ
proposed a “Common Document” that would be endorsed by the
FCO
and DFID,
to ensure the UK delivered the consistent message needed to
influence
US
post-conflict planning.
101.
On 20 January,
a PJHQ official provided Major General Rob Fry, Deputy Chief
of
Joint
Operations (Operations), with “a proposed way forward on Phase IV
work”.54
The
official
advised:
“The first
issue that we have faced in doing this work is that many (senior)
people
have been
generating ideas to contribute to the Phase IV planning, but to
date
without a
conceptual framework … The result has been a sense of
increasing
concern
that the issue is not being adequately gripped (which in turn has
prompted
further
high level input). To address this and using a slightly modified
version of
CENTCOM’s
framework, we have formulated just such a framework and called
it
‘the Common
Document’ … The aspiration is that … we will be able to
produce
a
cross-Government agreed UK ‘manifesto’, from which we would be able
to
guide
subsequent engagement with the US. It also provides a mechanism
for
systematically
identifying issues that need to be resolved.
“… We also
need to integrate any SPG [Strategic Planning Group] work that
has
been done
on this subject and cross-check it against UK peacekeeping doctrine
…
[I]t is in
the first instance intended as a planning tool, a mechanism for
pooling UK
thinking on
aftermath. We should not be in the business of doing the thinking,
just
collecting
it and making it coherent.
“… The
Common Document has yet to be briefed outside the department, but
will
need FCO
and DFID input to be any use …
…
“Unfortunately
time is not on our side, however, and we have an increasing
concern
about our
ability to populate the framework in the time available … We
recommend,
therefore,
that we should hold a week long cross-government planning seminar
to
help
complete the document. Effectively this would be a single
‘big-push’ to pull
together
all government thinking on aftermath …
“Overcoming
the institutional resistance to such a proposal would also be
a
challenge …
To make it work, we would need active support (not just
acquiescence)
from the
top of MOD, the FCO and DFID (and probably the Cabinet Office).
This
might take
some effort …
54
Minute
PJHQ/Hd of J9 Pol/Ops to MA/DCJO(Ops), 20 January 2003, ‘Op TELIC:
Taking Forward
Aftermath
Planning’.
328