The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
181.
After the
talks, Mr Tony Brenton, Deputy Head of Mission at the British
Embassy
Washington,
explained to Mr Abrams that the UK “very much hoped” to be
consulted
before the
US took decisions on areas in which the UK had “a crucial
interest”, including
the
post-conflict role of the UN and governance of the Iraqi oil
sector. Mr Abrams
suggested
that Sir David Manning should ask Dr Rice to share emerging US
thinking.
182.
The British
Embassy reported the next day that Mr Abrams had
discussed
the UN role
with Dr Rice.92
Her view
was firm: the US agreed that some kind of UN
mandate
should be sought as the basis for post-conflict Coalition activity,
but there
was no
question of any high-profile UN role in administering the country.
UN agencies’
contribution
to humanitarian relief and reconstruction would be crucial, but
there could
be no
high-level UN administrator or UN involvement in running even
technical Iraqi
ministries.
183.
After the
first meeting of the trilateral economic working group, UK
officials
reported
that DoD had prepared detailed contingency plans for Iraq’s oil
industry,
but that
there was “a conspicuous disconnect” between those plans and
civilian
planning
for economic development and management.
184.
The UK
delegation to the meeting of the trilateral economic working group
in
Washington
on 5 February included representatives of the FCO, DFID, the
Treasury,
the British
Embassy and the UK Delegation to the IMF/IBRD (International Bank
of
Reconstruction
and Development).93
The US
delegation included a team from the State
Department
and representatives of DoD, USAID, the NSC and the US
Treasury.
185.
The British
Embassy reported that the working group had agreed to co-operate
on
defining
practical economic steps to be taken in the first three to six
months of military
occupation.
The UK would contribute its ideas by 14 February.
186.
US thinking on
short-term reconstruction was reported to be at an early
stage.
Little
thought had been given to the financing gap that might arise if
Iraqi oil output were
severely
constrained.
187.
The Embassy
reported that DoD had detailed contingency plans to
protect
and restore
the oil sector and was well aware of the importance of that sector
for
reconstruction.
In the best case (minimal damage, current levels of output
restored
after two
to three months) it estimated that the sector could make a net
contribution
of US$12bn
in the first year after any conflict; in the worst case it could be
a net cost
of US$8bn.
92
Telegram
172 Washington to FCO London, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day
After’.
93
Telegram
169 Washington to FCO London, 6 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Meeting of
Trilateral Working Group
on “Day
After” Economic Issues: Short Term Reconstruction’.
342