The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

641. Mr Brenton concluded:

“At the Azores Summit … Bush will be looking for a way of making the transition

from the UN process to the military countdown in a manner maximally helpful to the

Prime Minister. A key component of this will be the announcement of our intentions

for a post-Saddam Iraq, and in particular the level of UN involvement in administering.

[…] and there is a clear US red line on fighting to liberate Iraq and then handing

the governance over to the UN. Extensive UN involvement short of this ought to

be achievable, and is a prize worth fighting for.”

642. Mr Blair saw the telegram on the way to the Azores Summit.

643. Mr Sherard Cowper-Coles, the British Ambassador to Israel, subsequently

reported that there were some suggestions that the announcement of the Road Map

had been a gesture to help Mr Blair; and that “as such it should not be taken too

seriously by Israel”.219

644. Mr Blair contacted a number of leaders to prepare the ground for the

announcement that the UK would be taking no further action on the draft

resolution.

645. Mr Rycroft recorded that in the conversation with Mr John Howard, the Australian

Prime Minister, on 15 March, Mr Howard asked “if the diplomatic process was dead”.220

Mr Blair replied that it had “reached an impasse. The process would struggle on until

Monday. Even the Russian position was making things difficult.”

646. Mr Blair added that “a way forward could have been found” if everyone had

supported the proposals tabled by the UK the previous week; the “US had not been

eager about the proposals, but they were prepared to go along with them. The tests

had been taken from the Inspectors’ own reports – they were perfectly reasonable.”

Saddam Hussein was “now busy hiding material around Iraq”.

647. Mr Blair and Mr Howard also discussed the effect of the French veto which

the “elected six”’ were “hiding behind”. The implication would be that the US, UK and

Australian troops should stay in the region indefinitely; without forces in the region the

inspectors would be “kicked out”. If it was clear the diplomatic process was not going

to proceed, there was little point in putting the resolution to a vote.

648. Mr Blair and Mr Howard also discussed the role of the UN and international

financial institutions after conflict and the importance of a Road Map for the MEPP.

219 Telegram 109 Tel Aviv to FCO London, 17 March 2003, ‘MEPP/Iraq: Local US View’.

220 Letter [Francis] Campbell to Owen, 15 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Australia, 15 March’.

510