12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
597.
On 16
September, Mr Blair chaired a meeting of the Ad Hoc
Ministerial Group on
Iraq (AHMGI
– see Section 2), called “to ensure the UK Government approach to
Iraq
was fully
co‑ordinated in the period up to Iraqi elections in January
2005”.542
He
intended
that the
Group should meet regularly.
598.
Given an
insurgency that appeared to be increasingly co‑ordinated,
Mr Blair told
the Group
that he was “concerned that the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) did not
have
sufficient
capability to take on the insurgents.”
599.
Gen Walker
reported that plans were in place for the ISF to be fully equipped
and
trained by
mid‑2005, but that their capabilities would remain limited,
especially compared
with the
MNF. There was little scope for accelerating the
plans.
600.
The Group
agreed that the MOD would “make recommendations on how
ISF
capacity
will develop and what more we can do to accelerate or refine the
delivery to
allow the
ISF to tackle the current insurgency campaign”.
601.
General Sir
Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, visited Iraq from 12
to
15 September.543
In his
report, he observed:
“… the
generation of trained and equipped ISF and IPS is taking
considerably more
time than
expected … Although General Petraeus was buoyant about the
progress
in ISF and
the recent performance of two of their battalions in Najaf, there
is an
underlying
reservation highlighted by many, including Gen Casey, that
improvement
is slow –
the faster release of allocated funds will help.”
602.
On 19
September, Mr Blair met Prime Minister Allawi and Iraqi
Ministers at
No.10.544
In
Mr Quarrey’s note of the meeting to Mr Straw’s Private
Secretary, he wrote
that
Dr Allawi had expressed frustration at the pace of
Iraqiisation which had followed
“the slow
route of General Petraeus” and “had told Bush that he needed
security
capacity
now, not next year”.
603.
Mr Blair
said that it was important that the long‑term work continued but
that
there was
also a need rapidly to increase the capacity of Iraqi intelligence
and the ISF.
Prime
Minister Allawi requested a meeting with senior defence and
intelligence officials
from the
US, UK and Iraq “to discuss problems with Iraqiisation”. When Iraqi
Ministers
suggested a
halt to de‑Ba’athification, Mr Blair and Dr Allawi agreed
that the IIG needed
“a
practical approach”.
604.
In a private
meeting with Mr Blair afterwards, Dr Allawi said security
was his
personal
focus, but was part of wider work on an overall strategy addressing
national
reconciliation
and Sunni outreach, building the economy and building up the
institutions
542
Minutes, 16
September 2004, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
meeting.
543
Minute CGS
to CDS, 17 September 2004, ‘CGS Visit to OP TELIC 12‑15 Sep
04’.
544
Minute
Quarrey to Owen, 19 September 2004, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Lunch
with Allawi, 19 September’.
187