The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
852.
On 29 October,
Mr Bowen reported to Sir David Manning that the Chiefs of
Staff
were
pressing for a decision in principle on Package 3.341
853.
Mr Bowen
stated that Gen Franks understood the UK position, “including
the
political
dimension” and had “directed that planning should proceed on the
basis of US
forces only
operating out of Turkey” and that the 4th Infantry Division would
be “the main
combat
formation”. Package 3 “would still be welcome as an addition and
could have the
particular
task of integrating other coalition members’
contributions”.
“The MOD
argue that they are being excluded from detailed planning and
their
influence
in discussing issues like the aftermath is
diminishing.”
855.
Mr Bowen
commented that some of the assumptions behind the MOD case
were
“fragile”.
The planning date of early January was “no more than a military
[planning]
assumption”,
and the willingness of Turkey to accept any ground forces was
“still in
doubt”. But
the military needed to make such assumptions if they were to “get
on with
the job of
planning complex operations for extremely uncertain
scenarios”.
856.
Mr Bowen
wrote that the MOD would be arguing that:
•
It was to
the UK’s disadvantage to be excluded from planning for the
northern
option.
•
The
“Turkish dimension” needed to be fully explored if the UK was to
be
involved.
•
A
commitment in principle did not lock the UK into a commitment in
practice.
•
The UK
leadership of other coalition members’ involvement could be
prejudiced.
857.
The MOD would
concede that notification of the Reserves “could be postponed,
on
the basis
that a commitment in principle would enable them to cause the US
military to
re‑examine
the assumptions with a view to negotiating a more realistic
date”.
858.
In addition to
Sir David Manning’s questions about the implications of
offering
Package 3,
whether it would be “realistic to think we could backtrack from a
decision
in
principle” and whether the UK understood what it would be getting
into, Mr Bowen
identified
the need to consider costs, “the overall profile” the UK wished to
adopt, and
the need to
factor in slippage in the timetable at the UN and Turkish
decisions.
859.
Mr Bowen
viewed the US decision to earmark the 4th Infantry Division as
“helpful”
because it
showed it was “committed strategically” and would “take the lead”,
but he
added that
Turkey’s position might mean that nothing would come of the
northern axis.
341
Minute
Bowen to Manning, 29 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Whether to Offer Package
3 to the US?’
306