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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
“It would be wrong to say this was kicked into the long grass, but other solutions,
work‑arounds were preferred than tackling this one head‑on …I am not a technical
person, I am not a scientist …”
662.  The Inquiry asked why the Mastiff programme had been initiated by Ministers
rather than the Defence Board providing the answers to what, by then, was recognised
every day in Iraq to be a serious problem.348 Gen Dannatt replied:
“I was purely a member of the Defence Board, and there were many people around
the table and many conflicting points of view. You can articulate your point of view as
clearly as you can. Others might be persuaded by your argument or choose not to
be persuaded by your argument. … In many cases they chose not to be persuaded
by my argument. So one had to accept the decisions that were taken, albeit with
a degree of frustration.”
CHANGES TO THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR IDENTIFYING AND FUNDING UORS
663.  The earlier part of this Section, considering improvements in the MOD’s
procurement processes during Op TELIC, looks in more detail at the advice given by
Lt Gen Houghton in 2006 on how to improve the way in which capability gaps were
identified.
664.  At the same time, concern was growing about the MOD’s failure to control
expenditure on UORs for Iraq and Afghanistan, leading the Treasury to seek a new
arrangement for funding UORs.
665.  When ECAB discussed a review of the Equipment Programme on 5 July
2006, it was pointed out “that considerable work had been undertaken (including the
engagement of Ministers) on the PPV issue and protected mobility”, but there were
remaining concerns about:
“… the ability of the routine procurement process to react quickly enough to match
changing threats. The UOR process worked well at the start of a campaign, but was
not designed to support enduring operations.”349
666.  On 24 November, Mr Browne wrote to Mr Timms to request an increase of £460m
in the combined UOR funding.350 Despite tight controls, the requirements for UORs
continued “at a rate higher than anticipated, and considerably above historical norms”,
because of:
the intensity of operations in Afghanistan;
the slow drawdown of forces from Iraq;
348  Public hearing, 28 July 2010, pages 67‑68.
349  Minutes, 5 July 2006, Executive Committee of the Army Board meeting.
350  Minute MOD [junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 November 2006, ‘Additional Funding for
Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs)’.
114
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