The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“It would
be wrong to say this was kicked into the long grass, but other
solutions,
work‑arounds
were preferred than tackling this one head‑on …I am not a
technical
person, I
am not a scientist …”
662.
The Inquiry
asked why the Mastiff programme had been initiated by
Ministers
rather than
the Defence Board providing the answers to what, by then, was
recognised
every day
in Iraq to be a serious problem.348
Gen Dannatt
replied:
“I was
purely a member of the Defence Board, and there were many people
around
the table
and many conflicting points of view. You can articulate your point
of view as
clearly as
you can. Others might be persuaded by your argument or choose not
to
be
persuaded by your argument. … In many cases they chose not to be
persuaded
by my
argument. So one had to accept the decisions that were taken,
albeit with
a degree
of frustration.”
663.
The earlier
part of this Section, considering improvements in the
MOD’s
procurement
processes during Op TELIC, looks in more detail at the advice given
by
Lt Gen Houghton
in 2006 on how to improve the way in which capability gaps
were
identified.
664.
At the same
time, concern was growing about the MOD’s failure to
control
expenditure
on UORs for Iraq and Afghanistan, leading the Treasury to seek a
new
arrangement
for funding UORs.
665.
When ECAB
discussed a review of the Equipment Programme on 5
July
2006, it
was pointed out “that considerable work had been undertaken
(including the
engagement
of Ministers) on the PPV issue and protected mobility”, but there
were
remaining
concerns about:
“… the
ability of the routine procurement process to react quickly enough
to match
changing
threats. The UOR process worked well at the start of a campaign,
but was
not
designed to support enduring operations.”349
666.
On 24
November, Mr Browne wrote to Mr Timms to request an
increase of £460m
in the
combined UOR funding.350
Despite
tight controls, the requirements for UORs
continued
“at a rate higher than anticipated, and considerably above
historical norms”,
because
of:
•
the
intensity of operations in Afghanistan;
•
the slow
drawdown of forces from Iraq;
348
Public
hearing, 28 July 2010, pages 67‑68.
349
Minutes, 5
July 2006, Executive Committee of the Army Board
meeting.
350
Minute
MOD [junior
official] to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 November 2006,
‘Additional Funding for
Urgent
Operational Requirements (UORs)’.
114