The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“We
established good links into the UK Division. Garner wanted to
establish an
ORHA
office/footprint in or around Basra as soon as events allowed, and
he wanted
it to be UK
led – initially by me. Whitehall seemed to refuse to countenance
the idea;
it was
never explained to me why this was so, but I sensed a fear that
this would
lead to
[the] UK having to bear the brunt of reconstruction costs in the
South/South
West area.
I was given fairly clear direction not to agree to this – just
about the only
clear
direction I received on any issue!”159
285.
Maj Gen Cross
told the Inquiry that, once in Baghdad, Lt Gen Garner’s
authority
became
“brutally exposed”:
“The [ORHA]
ministry teams fanned out and each reported back, initially
quite
positively.
Most found Iraqis prepared to work with us, buildings standing and
files
etc
available – many having been secured at the homes of various
officials. But as
the
security situation began to deteriorate the US military commanders
refused to
provide
sufficient escort vehicles, and then stopped anyone moving around
without
an escort.
Meetings were disrupted and, most crucially, the Ministry buildings
began
to be
targeted and burnt and looted – Garner repeatedly asked for crucial
key points
to be
guarded but his pleas met with little response. Linked to this the
contractual
support
from the USAID reconstruction effort failed to materialise. There
were few
resources
to work with, and a vacuum of inactivity was created.
“… Garner
realised that we couldn’t possibly run the country – we had
nowhere
near enough
people to do that – so we had to enable them [the Iraqi people]
to
do it
themselves. But his efforts were undermined and he got little
support from
Washington.
I received no direction from the UK on our policy on
this.”160
286.
Maj Gen Cross
also told the Inquiry that, as security in Baghdad worsened,
he
secured
equipment, vehicles and personal protection through personal
contacts in the
UK Armed
Forces.161
He received
little support from the UK Government:
“To be fair
communications were difficult, but I was given little support –
still no idea
what our UK
strategic intent was, no response to my ‘Must-Should-Could’
paper.
If it had
not been for my personal contacts within the UK military I would
have had
virtually
no support … my impression was that Whitehall was uncertain of
where to
go from
here, and I sensed that the FCO felt it better not to be implicated
too much
in what was
happening – rather let the MOD get it wrong!!”
287.
At their 24
April meeting, the AHMGIR considered an IPU/FCO paper
entitled
‘Oil/Energy
Policy for Iraq’.162
The paper
described itself as a “stock-take” which built
on previous
work by the IPU.163
159
Statement,
2009, pages 17-19.
160
Statement,
2009, page 22.
161
Statement,
2009, pages 22-23.
162
Minutes, 24
April 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
163
Paper IPU,
22 April 2003, ‘Oil/Energy Policy for Iraq’.
54