The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
said
he had never known a Head of Mission take umbrage at separate,
parallel,
correspondence
between the Mission legal adviser and the FCO Legal
Advisers.
1077.
Sir Daniel
Bethlehem, Sir Michael’s successor as FCO Legal Adviser,
agreed
fully with
the observations that had been made in evidence about the wholly
exceptional
nature of
the negotiations that led to resolution 1441.411
He
identified the close personal
involvement
of the Foreign Secretary, the particular political significance of
the
resolution,
the sensitivity of the issues in question, their security
classification and the
potential
consequences that would follow from the resolution as the reasons
for the
exceptional
nature.
1078.
Sir Daniel
also commented on the formality of the process of instruction
from
London to
UKMIS New York during the negotiation of resolution
1441.
1079.
Sir Daniel
added that in more recent years issues concerning the
negotiation
of Security
Council resolutions would be conducted by email (with multiple
copy
addresses),
video‑conferencing and other mechanisms which enabled timely,
inclusive
and
interactive communication, as well as by more formal electronic
telegrams.
1080.
The
declared objective of the US and UK was to obtain
international
support
within the framework of the UN for a strategy of coercive
diplomacy
for the
disarmament of Iraq. For the UK, regime change was a means to
achieve
disarmament,
not an objective in its own right.
1081.
A new UN
resolution was a key element of Mr Blair’s “clever
strategy”
to achieve
the policy objectives of the US and UK in a manner which
fostered
international
unanimity and maintained the authority of the UN.
1082.
The UK’s
stated objective for the negotiation of resolution 1441 was to
give
Saddam
Hussein “one final chance to comply” with his obligations to
disarm. The
UK
initially formulated the objective in terms of:
•
a
resolution setting out an ultimatum to Iraq to readmit the UN
weapons
inspectors
and to disarm in accordance with its obligations; and
•
a threat to
resort to the use of force to secure disarmament if Iraq
failed
to comply.
1083.
Iraq’s
agreement in principle on 16 September to the return of
inspectors,
was almost
certainly a response to President Bush’s speech on 12 September,
but
the US and
UK immediately expressed scepticism about the terms on which
Iraq
would
readmit inspectors and its future conduct.
411
Statement,
24 June 2011, pages 4‑5.
386