1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
362.
Addressing
comments by other members of the Council about Dr Blix’s
report,
Ambassador
Richardson stated:
“… even in
this area it is clear that Iraq has not answered all the relevant
questions
necessary
to have a full accounting of its programmes. The books cannot be
closed.
Furthermore,
we now know, thanks to the efforts of Mr Blix and his staff,
that Iraq
lied and
concealed an active weaponization programme for years in direct
defiance
of its
commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons
(NPT) and
its commitments to the IAEA. Iraq has lied about its programmes for
too
long and
too recently for us to settle for anything less than absolute
certainty that
Iraq’s
nuclear ambitions have been completely neutralized.
“When
accounting for nuclear weapons, close is not good enough. If you
fail
to account
for just one nuclear device, that could mean the destruction of
an
entire city.”
363.
Ambassador
Richardson concluded that Baghdad had “a clear and simple
choice”
while
commending the approach of Mr Butler and his team and stating
that the Council
“must do
everything” it could to support him. He regretted the decision of
some members
of the
Council not to support the resolution, which would “carry the full
weight of
international
law”.
364.
Japan, Poland,
Portugal and Sweden spoke in support of the resolution, but
in
more
moderate terms than either the US or UK.
365.
Mr Elaraby
drew attention to Dr Blix’s report and the progress in some
areas
reported by
Mr Butler, and set out conclusions in seven areas that Egypt
would have
liked to
see included in the resolution for the evaluation of the
implementation of the
Council’s
resolutions and the Council’s future actions. These
were:
•
The draft
resolution should have taken into account the positive
aspects
reported
by UNSCOM and the IAEA.
•
The Council
“must be the only body responsible” for making decisions,
“following
consultations
and discussions on the basis of reports submitted by the
Special
Commission”.
•
The IAEA
and Special Commission were responsible for “purely
technical
matters”.
While it was “difficult” for them “to assert that nothing remains
to be
destroyed”
it was “important” for the Council to take the decision “defining
the
ultimate
goal of the activities of those two bodies in order that the
Council’s
resolutions
can be fully implemented in detail”.
•
The Council
should “take the time … objectively” to study the differences
in
view
between the Special Commission and Iraq about the interpretation of
the
modalities
for inspections. Further co-operation was needed from Iraq, but
the
Special
Commission also had to “make an effort” to co-operate so that it
could
discharge
its responsibilities.
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