The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
ready
access and to clarify the nature of the activities” at those
facilities. “No prohibited
nuclear
activities” had been identified.
716.
Dr ElBaradei
described the Iraqi declaration as “consistent with our
understanding
of Iraq’s
pre‑1991 nuclear programme”. Iraq had not provided “any new
information
relevant to
… questions which had been outstanding since 1998”. While those
questions
did “not
constitute unresolved disarmament issues”, further clarification
was needed.
717.
The IAEA had
been conducting “exhaustive analysis of supporting
information”.
Dr ElBaradei
also reported difficulties in securing private interviews with the
three
individuals
the IAEA had approached.
718.
Iraq’s
unsuccessful attempts to procure high‑strength aluminium tubes
which
Iraq had
indicated were related to a programme to reverse engineer
conventional
rockets,
had been a particular focus. The IAEA had concluded that the tubes
“would be
consistent
with” use in a conventional rocket programme. They “would not be
suitable
for
manufacturing centrifuges” without modification. The IAEA was
“still investigating” the
issue, but
the attempt to acquire such tubes was “prohibited” by resolution
687 (1991).
719.
The IAEA was
investigating how “dual‑use” material had been relocated or
used,
including
the “HMX” high explosive which had been removed from IAEA seals at
the end
of 1998.
Dr ElBaradei stated that it would be difficult to verify how
that had been used.
720.
The IAEA was
investigating reports of Iraqi efforts to import uranium but it
did
“not have
enough information, and … would appreciate more”.
721.
Dr ElBaradei
stated that the IAEA had “begun in the last few weeks to
receive
more
actionable information from States”, and he called on those that
“had access to
such
information to provide it … so that the inspection process can be
accelerated and
additional
assurances generated”.
722.
Dr ElBaradei
emphasised the need for Iraq to “shift from passive support …
to
pro‑active
support”. He cited as an example the retrieval of documents
relating, “in
part, to
Iraq’s pre‑1991 efforts to use laser technology for enriching
uranium”. It was
“urgent and
essential” for Iraq “on its own initiative, to identify and provide
any additional
evidence
that would assist the inspectors in carrying out their
mandate”.
723.
Dr ElBaradei
warned that there was:
“… a window
of opportunity that may not remain open for very much longer.
Iraq
should make
every effort to be fully transparent … The international community
will
not be
satisfied when questions remain open … the world is asking for a
high level
of
assurance that Iraq is completely free from all such weapons, and
is already
impatient
to receive it.”
128