The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
586.
A committee
established by the P9 proposed five textual amendments
on
23 November,
including:
“…
reforming the local and provincial councils, thereby ensuring ‘the
highest possible
degree of
representation’; ensuring that security arrangements reaffirmed
the
sovereignty
and independence of Iraq; asking the UN Secretary-General to
appoint
a
representative to help in the political process; and defining a
role for the IGC
post-hand
over and until a permanent Constitution is
adopted.”328
587.
Sir Jeremy
reported that he and Ambassador Bremer would “remain firm on
key
principles”.
588.
On 26
November, the JIC assessed security in Iraq.329
It judged that
the number
of “significant
incidents” had risen from 30 to 36 per day, though the frequency
of
significant
attacks in MND(SE) had not increased and remained lower than in
other
parts of
the country.
589.
The JIC
assessed that this was the result of increased involvement of
“former
regime
elements” who had moved into MND(SE) from elsewhere:
“It does
not, therefore, necessarily indicate a loss of local Shia support
(there are
some
indications that this support may actually be increasing in
MND(SE)).”
590.
In addition to
the ongoing threat from former regime elements, the JIC
pointed
to the
threat to stability that came from “disaffected Iraqis – those
without jobs, those
who have
been disadvantaged by the change in regime, or those who simply
find the
conditions
of life worse than before the war”. It also assessed that, while
Muqtada al
Sadr’s
supporters had “dwindled”, he still commanded “sufficient influence
to be a threat,
particularly
in Najaf, Karbala and Baghdad”.
591.
The Cabinet
Office Annotated Agenda for the AHMGIR meeting the following
day
observed
that:
“Although
the number of security incidents has fallen in the last few days,
it is too
soon to say
that this represents a trend to improved security.”330
592.
The same
document also recorded that Mr Jalal Talabani, President of
the GC, had
written to
Mr Annan asking him to appoint a new UN Special
Representative. A second
letter set
out the political timetable and asked the Security Council for a
new resolution.
Cabinet
Office officials stated:
“The
question of what future UNSCRs will be required to underpin the
timetable is a
matter for
debate.”
328
Telegram
282 IraqRep to FCO London, 24 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Roundup’.
329
JIC
Assessment, 26 November 2003, ‘Iraq Security’.
330 Annotated
Agenda, 27 November 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
304