1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
275.
On 10 May, at
the request of the MOD, the JIC assessed “what we know of
Iraq’s
WMD
programmes, their future direction, our level of confidence in the
intelligence,
our
confidence in being able to identify the location of Iraq’s WMD
facilities accurately
and the
potential impact of direct military action against
them”.151
The
Assessment is
considered
in detail in Section 4.1.
276.
The JIC stated
that its “knowledge of
developments” in Iraq’s
WMD and ballistic
missile
programmes since December 1998 was “patchy”,
but judged that “intelligence
gives grounds
for concern and suggests
that Iraq is becoming bolder in conducting
activities
prohibited by UNSCR 687”.
277.
The JIC knew
most about Iraq’s ballistic missile programme, where there had
been
a step
change in progress over the previous two years.
278.
The JIC
continued to “assess that while sanctions remain in place, Iraq
cannot
indigenously
develop and produce nuclear weapons. Were sanctions lifted, it
would take
Iraq at least
five years to produce a nuclear device and a
further two to
produce
a
warhead.”
279.
The JIC
assessed the vulnerability of Iraq’s WMD programmes, and judged
that:
“Although
some WMD facilities could be destroyed by direct military action,
this
would
be unlikely to
have a significant impact on Iraq’s WMD programmes …”
“…
our ability
to constrain Iraqi development of its WMD through other
means
[other than
military action] is
limited. The
development of Iraq’s WMD has been
helped in
recent years by the absence
of UN inspectors, the increase in illegal
border trade
and hard currency available to Iraq. There have
been an increasing
number of
[…] reports on orders for illegal imports of missile related
components and
materials
[…] Because of the need for raw materials and components from
abroad,
sanctions
remain an obstacle to the development of all Iraq’s WMD
programmes.”
281.
Under the
heading “Implications”, the JIC stated:
“This
assessment underlines the importance of pursuing vigorously work on
the
proposed UN
controlled goods list, which would help sustain effective controls
on
Iraqi WMD
development.”
282.
Mr Cook
reported that there had been good progress in agreeing a
proposal
for a new
sanctions regime with the US, but less on securing an agreement
with
regional
states to reduce oil smuggling.
283.
Mr Cook
repeated his view that the UK should consider ending patrols of
the
southern
NFZ.
151
JIC
Assessment, 10 May 2001, ‘Iraqi WMD Programmes: Status and
Vulnerability’.
245