The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
allegations
made by Saddam Hussein’s regime that sanctions were damaging
the
people of
Iraq were true.203
The UK had
tried to get the World Health Organization
(WHO) into
Iraq to assess the situation, but Saddam Hussein had refused
permission.
Sir William
judged that:
“... it was
in Iraq’s interest not to have a reasonable assessment because,
obviously,
if the
picture was left to them to tell, they would exploit that picture.
So there wasn’t
a good
assessment, mainly because UN agencies couldn’t get in to do it,
and the
claims that
were coming out of Iraq were pretty spurious at best.”
353.
Military and
humanitarian planning began to converge in September, with
DFID’s
partial
integration into Whitehall’s reorganised Iraq planning machinery.
That change was
reflected
in a second DFID review, described later in this Section, which was
produced
in October
and included material on the possible impact of military action on
central and
354.
President
Bush signed the US national security document setting out
US
goals,
objectives and strategy for Iraq on 29 August 2002.
355.
The
document stated that the US was prepared to play a sustained role
in
the
reconstruction of post-Saddam Hussein Iraq with contributions from
and the
participation
of the international community.
356.
On 29 August
2002, President Bush signed the national security document
‘Iraq:
Goals,
Objectives, Strategy’.205
The stated
goal of the US was to free Iraq in order to:
•
eliminate
WMD;
•
end Iraqi
threats to its neighbours;
•
stop the
Iraqi government tyrannising its own people;
•
cut Iraqi
links to terrorism; and
•
“[l]iberate
the Iraqi people from tyranny and assist them in creating a
society
based on
moderation, pluralism and democracy.”206
357.
The document
stated that the US was “prepared to play a sustained role in
the
reconstruction
of post-Saddam Iraq with contribution from and participation of
the
international
community”, and that it would work closely with the Iraqi
opposition to
liberate
and build a new Iraq.207
203
Public
hearing, 24 November 2009, pages 164-165.
204
Paper
Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Department, October 2002,
‘Central/southern Iraq humanitarian
situation
analysis’.
205
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
206
Feith
DJ. War and
Decision. Harper,
2008.
207
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
172