4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
rockets
getting through would have a disproportionate effect” and it was
“not
unreasonable
for Saddam to think it would give us second thoughts”.
•
“CBW armed
Al Hussein attack on Israel. Again very difficult to achieve, but
the
benefits of
success are obvious.”
•
“A move
against the Kurds either immediately before or after a
Coalition
invasion …”
230.
Mr Scarlett’s
comments on Iraq’s response to military action are addressed
in
Section
6.2.
231.
Mr Blair
told Cabinet on 30 January that he would be discussing the policy
on Iraq
with
President Bush the following day.93
232.
In the
subsequent discussion it was suggested that the onus was on
Saddam
Hussein to
explain the discrepancies between the Iraqi declaration and a
series of
unanswered
questions: “about 223 missile motors imported illegally; the
production
of VX nerve
agent; 6,500 missing chemical bombs; 12 newly stored chemical
shells;
and the
refusal to allow [Iraqi] scientists to be interviewed in private”
listed by Dr Blix.
Resolution
1441 “demanded Iraqi co-operation: it was not for the inspectors to
act like
detectives
to find evidence of Saddam Hussein’s guilt”.
In
anticipation of Secretary Powell’s presentation of 5 February,
Mr Sabri wrote to
Mr Annan
on 31 January requesting the US Government to “submit immediately
its
alleged
evidence” to enable UNMOVIC and the IAEA to begin investigations
and report to
Mr Sabri
also stated that the 518 inspections since 27 November, which
included all
the sites
identified by the US and UK, had shown that the allegations were
“devoid of
truth and
had been drafted in order to distort the picture of Iraq and create
pretexts for
aggression
against Iraq and against the region as a whole”.
233.
Following his
meeting with President Bush in Washington on 31 January
(see
Section
3.6), Mr Blair made a statement to Parliament on
3 February (see Section 3.7).95
234.
Mr Blair
referred to a “report” which had been “published at the weekend”
and
which he
had placed in the Library of the House of Commons, which made clear
that
93
Cabinet
Conclusions, 30 January 2003.
94
UN Security
Council, 31 January 2003, ‘Letter dated 31 January 2003 from the
Permanent
Representative
of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General’
(S/2003/132).
95
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 3
February 2003, columns 21-22.
337