The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

864.  NSID(OD) met on 20 November to take stock of the situation in Basra.504 Cabinet

Office officials briefed Mr Brown that the main aim of the meeting was “to ensure that

the transfer to Iraqi control in Basra, scheduled for 17 December is not delayed” and

that the meeting would need to assess the security situation in Basra and look at how

to sustain the present reduction in violence, including through possible political or

economic measures.

865.  At the meeting, Mr Alexander reported that Mr Wareing had agreed to help drive

forward the work of the BDC. Several of the projects included within the BDC’s 2007

plan had been requested by local militia leaders, which would help “lock them into the

economic and political process”.

866.  Mr Browne observed that, from a force protection perspective, it would be

important to keep local militia leaders engaged and bring them into the wider political

and economic process as much as possible. Sir John Scarlett agreed that it would be

important to find ways of broadening the dialogue to address a wider range of political

and economic issues.

867.  Summing up the meeting, Mr Brown said that:

• the UK should “press ahead” with the transfer of Basra to PIC on 17 December;

• economic projects should be agreed through proper discussion with local

representatives, rather than favouring any faction or individual, though that “did

not preclude using a coincidence of interest to draw local militia leaders into the

wider political process”;

• Mr Alexander should write with plans for the launch of the BDC; and

• the UK should continue to encourage the Iraqi Government to hold provincial

elections as soon as possible.

868.  After the meeting, Sir John Scarlett’s Private Secretary produced a summary of

his account of the meeting.505 The summary stated that Mr Alexander had expressed

concerns about development projects agreed with JAM1 drawing resources and

expertise away from existing projects. There was general support for resource decisions

to be taken in theatre where conflicts arose between priorities.

869.  Mr Jones told the Inquiry that:

“… there had been a debate in advance of PIC as to how we could be sure that the

whole situation in Basra remained stable. The economy was identified as the crucial

thing, and we had many hours of amusement discussing that in Basra with our

military colleagues, the degree to which we could help.” 506

504  Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 19 November 2007, ‘NSID(OD) Iraq Meeting –

Steering Brief: Tuesday 20 November 16:45-17:30’.

505  Minute PS/C, 21 November 2007, ‘NSID (IRAQ) 20 NOV 2007’.

506  Private hearing, 24 June 2010, page 58.

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