3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
1146.
Responding to
Secretary Powell’s statement that there was a lack of a
strategic
political
decision by Iraq to demonstrate its commitment to comply with the
UN
resolutions,
Mr Aldouri stated that Iraq had taken “the strategic decision
to rid itself
of weapons
of mass destruction” in 1991. He added that:
“All
weapons that have been proscribed fall into one of two categories:
they have
been either
declared or unilaterally destroyed by Iraq. All the declarations
that Iraq
has been
repeatedly asked to present concerned the details and verification
of that
unilateral
destruction and nothing … else. It is for the accusers to prove
otherwise,
if they
possess any evidence.”
1147.
Mr Aldouri
stated that Iraq had no VX programme.
1148.
Mr Aldouri
stated that the issues of concern identified by the US and UK were
“an
attempt to
confuse the issue” and mask their real agenda to take over Iraq’s
oil and the
political
and economic domination of the region. Iraq continued to hope for
justice from
the
Security Council and called on the Council to thwart aggression and
prevent “a crime
whose
impact would far surpass that of any crime of the past century”. He
concluded:
“… war
against Iraq will wreak destruction, but it will not unearth any
weapons of
mass
destruction, for one very simple reason: there are no such weapons,
except
in the
imagination of some …”
1149.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that questions had been raised about
what
would
demonstrate that Iraq had taken the strategic decision to disarm.
There was
no visible
indication of additional votes.
1150.
A “side
statement” including benchmarks could be needed to bring
Chile
and Mexico
on board.
1151.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that, during the lunch for Foreign
Ministers
hosted by
Mr Annan:
•
Mr Annan
had appealed for Council unity and for UN responsibility
post-conflict
on
humanitarian relief and administrative matters.
•
Mr Straw
had “defended the ultimatum idea and focused it on Iraqi
co-operation,
which
needed no time at all to signal convincingly”.
•
Secretary
Powell had said the “US would not have come to the UN unless
it
believed in
collective action” and that the US “would want the UN in Iraq as
soon
as
circumstances allowed”.
•
Dr Blix
had said that the “months he needed were for verification with
a
compliant
Iraq … if Saddam could turn out 13,000 pages in a month, he
could
manage one
and a half pages of a convincing commitment to compliance in
a
347
Telegram
389 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 8 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 7 March Open
Debate
and Lunch’.
387