The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

940. The evidence set out in this Section demonstrates that, by the end of

January, Mr Blair had taken a public position that Iraq was failing fully to comply

with resolution 1441, and that this was a further material breach.

941. Mr Blair told the Inquiry that Saddam Hussein:

“… was deliberately concealing documentation, and … he was deliberately

not allowing people to be interviewed properly.

“In December 2002 … we received information, and this information remains valid,

that Saddam called together his key people and said that anybody who agreed

to an interview outside of Iraq was to be treated as a spy.”312

942. Mr Blair suggested that Saddam Hussein:

“… retained full intent to restart his programme, and, therefore, it was very

important for him that interviews did not take place, because the interviews with

senior regime members were precisely what would have indicated the concealment

and the intent.”313

943. Asked whether there was a risk that, in putting down the second resolution the

UK would appear to be trying to curtail the inspection process because of the demands

of the military planning, Mr Blair replied:

“It was more … the other way round, that what we were trying to do was to say: ‘how

do you resolve what, on any basis, is a somewhat indistinct picture being painted by

Dr Blix?’”314

944. In his memoir Mr Blair quoted at length from Dr Blix’s report of 27 January, which

he described as providing “essential context to understanding the decisions being taken

by me and others”.315

945. Mr Blair wrote that the report was:

“… critical to understand the context in which WMD were being debated in the

run‑up to the outbreak of conflict. We the key allies had no doubt that Saddam

had an active WMD programme …

“There could be no doubt that the only reason for the inspectors being allowed back

into Iraq was a threat of military action. The build‑up of American forces was likewise

the only conceivable reason for what co‑operation there was. But the co‑operation

fell short of what resolution 1441 demanded. And the history of dealing with Saddam

did not exactly lead to belief in his fidelity to the UN.”

312 Public hearing, 29 January 2010, page 104.

313 Public hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 104‑105.

314 Public hearing, 29 January 2010, page 116.

315 Blair T. A Journey. Hutchinson, 2010.

172