The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

375. Mr Blair replied: “Send a note from me to Val[erie] asking for this.”210

376. The Annotated Agenda for the 22 May meeting of the AHMGIR stated that

the arrival of Ambassador Bremer, who was “working closely” with Mr Sawers, had

made a significant impact on ORHA’s efficiency, but not yet its performance on the

ground.211 Officials were close to agreeing with Mr Andy Bearpark, UN Deputy Special

Representative in Kosovo, that he should succeed Maj Gen Cross, who was due to

leave ORHA in June. Mr Bearpark needed to be given the right job to “maximise UK

influence in ORHA”.

377. The Annotated Agenda also stated that 24 UK secondees had arrived in Iraq on

16 May, making a total of 61 UK secondees to ORHA. 11 of those were based in the

ORHA(South) office in Basra.

378. Ministers agreed that Maj Gen Cross should be replaced by “a senior UK civilian

experienced in humanitarian and reconstruction work, placed in a senior position”.212

379. Mr Bearpark was subsequently appointed CPA Director of Operations and

Infrastructure. He arrived in Baghdad on 16 June.

380. Section 9.2 describes how, although UK officials in Whitehall regarded Mr Bearpark

as the UK’s senior representative in the CPA, Mr Bearpark saw his primary loyalty as

lying with the CPA and Ambassador Bremer.

381. The 22 May meeting of the AHMGIR also considered a joint DFID/MOD paper on

achieving a “step change” in reconstruction in the South, requested by the AHMGIR the

previous week.213

382. The paper, entitled ‘Iraq: Rehabilitation in ORHA Region Lower South’, defined the

UK’s role in the South:

“The ORHA Lower South sector will be closely associated with the UK. Although the

ORHA regional office is headed by a Dane … the presence of a UK two-star regional

military headquarters will make the UK’s role in the area pre-eminent. The UK will

have the greatest number of military personnel in the region and, as one of two initial

Occupying Powers, will be seen by other nations to have leading responsibility for

the Lower South Region. If there are difficulties in the Lower South region it will be

the UK (and, immediately, the UK military) that will have to face them first.”214

383. The paper also set out the rationale for UK assistance. ORHA’s “mobilisation” was

proceeding slowly, and the UK was concerned that its use of large enabling contracts

210 Manuscript comment Blair on Letter Manning to Prime Minister, 22 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Visit to Baghdad

and Basra’.

211 Annotated Agenda, 22 May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

212 Minutes, 22 May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

213 Minutes, 22 May 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

214 Paper MOD/DFID, May 2003, ‘Iraq – Rehabilitation in ORHA region lower south’.

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