The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
working
through ORHA and doing what was possible to increase
ORHA’s
institutional
capacity; UK/US differences over legal issues would be likely
to
have an
impact on the UK’s ability to achieve that; and
•
finding
other ways to fulfil those tasks, for example through NGOs
or
international
agencies.
182.
The IPU noted
that ORHA would administer the whole of Iraq as part of
an
integrated
US-led approach and had large resources at its disposal, and
concluded:
“We may
wish to support 1 Div’s capacity to carry out specific actions (eg
repairing
the water
supply) in areas where we are responsible for maintaining
security.
But the
logic of ORHA – a nation-wide approach to Phase IV – limits the
UK’s
responsibilities
and exposure. Carving out a separate approach in a UK sector
would
make no
sense.
“The third
option is not incompatible with this or with the second option.
Indeed,
DFID may
well wish to go down this route as the primary means of
delivering
humanitarian
and, in due course, reconstruction assistance. We shall need to
keep
under
review where the balance of our overall effort lies.
“But ORHA
remains the Coalition’s transitional civil administration in
waiting and
is its
primary means for delivering humanitarian assistance. And at least
until the
UN agencies
and NGOs are present on the ground, only
ORHA/Coalition Forces
will be
in a position to do this. This paper thus focuses exclusively on
ORHA as
the means
for adding value and exerting UK influence in the
immediate
post‑conflict environment.”
183.
The IPU
advised that ORHA, which was then in Kuwait, had
approximately
200 staff,
expected to rise to over 1,000 by the time it deployed to Iraq. The
UK and
Australia
had each seconded six officers. Five more UK secondees were “in the
pipeline”
and one was
working in ORHA’s back office in the Pentagon. The UK
secondees
were “fully
integrated” and “adding significant value”. At ORHA’s request, the
IPU was
considering
whether to strengthen UK representation, particularly in the areas
of public
relations,
civil administration and humanitarian operations.
184.
The IPU
advised that Lt Gen Garner was reported to be expecting ORHA to
act
as the
transitional administration for 30 to 90 days. The priority for the
first 30 days was
likely to
be dealing with immediate humanitarian needs,
including:
•
restoration
of food supplies;
•
payment of
public sector salaries;
•
re-establishment
and rehabilitation of essential public services; and
•
working
closely with UN staff to restart the OFF programme.
34