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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
working through ORHA and doing what was possible to increase ORHA’s
institutional capacity; UK/US differences over legal issues would be likely to
have an impact on the UK’s ability to achieve that; and
finding other ways to fulfil those tasks, for example through NGOs or
international agencies.
182.  The IPU noted that ORHA would administer the whole of Iraq as part of an
integrated US-led approach and had large resources at its disposal, and concluded:
“We may wish to support 1 Div’s capacity to carry out specific actions (eg repairing
the water supply) in areas where we are responsible for maintaining security.
But the logic of ORHA – a nation-wide approach to Phase IV – limits the UK’s
responsibilities and exposure. Carving out a separate approach in a UK sector would
make no sense.
“The third option is not incompatible with this or with the second option. Indeed,
DFID may well wish to go down this route as the primary means of delivering
humanitarian and, in due course, reconstruction assistance. We shall need to keep
under review where the balance of our overall effort lies.
“But ORHA remains the Coalition’s transitional civil administration in waiting and
is its primary means for delivering humanitarian assistance. And at least until the
UN agencies and NGOs are present on the ground, only ORHA/Coalition Forces
will be in a position to do this. This paper thus focuses exclusively on ORHA as
the means for adding value and exerting UK influence in the immediate
post‑conflict environment.”
183.  The IPU advised that ORHA, which was then in Kuwait, had approximately
200 staff, expected to rise to over 1,000 by the time it deployed to Iraq. The UK and
Australia had each seconded six officers. Five more UK secondees were “in the pipeline”
and one was working in ORHA’s back office in the Pentagon. The UK secondees
were “fully integrated” and “adding significant value”. At ORHA’s request, the IPU was
considering whether to strengthen UK representation, particularly in the areas of public
relations, civil administration and humanitarian operations.
184.  The IPU advised that Lt Gen Garner was reported to be expecting ORHA to act
as the transitional administration for 30 to 90 days. The priority for the first 30 days was
likely to be dealing with immediate humanitarian needs, including:
restoration of food supplies;
payment of public sector salaries;
re-establishment and rehabilitation of essential public services; and
working closely with UN staff to restart the OFF programme.
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