3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
Hussein was
obviously in breach we would know”, Sir David added that “the
Security
Council
would know a material breach when it saw it”. He reported that the
US
Administration
would continue to insist on “zero tolerance” to keep up the
pressure
on Saddam
Hussein.
43.
Mr Straw
and Mr Colin Powell, US Secretary of State, also discussed
Iraq on
15 November,
including the reporting in the US that military action was imminent
and
inevitable.15
Mr Straw
emphasised the need to build as wide a coalition as possible
for
any
military action. They also discussed the need for patience on the
Middle East Peace
Process
(MEPP), because of the political situation in Israel.
44.
Sir Christopher
Meyer, British Ambassador to the US, took a slightly
different
view from
Sir Jeremy Greenstock about the US Administration’s
position.16
As he
had
previously
warned, “Administration hawks” would “seek to lower as far as
possible the
threshold
for attacking Iraq”. They hated resolution 1441 and were “looking
for ways of
short
circuiting it”. But, in his view, the “debate” on the NFZs was now
“over”; although if
an aircraft
was shot down that would “lead to war”. The reference to “zero
tolerance” was
the “key
[point] in the Administration’s public presentation”. There would
be a “battle …
between the
hawks and the rest”. The key would be President Bush’s
position.
45.
Sir Christopher
also reported that he had been told by a senior member of
the
Administration
earlier that week that the preferred outcome was for the Iraqi
regime
to implode.
46.
Dr Hans
Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, was asked, at his
pre‑inspections
press
conference on 15 November, whether, if Iraq continued to insist in
its declaration
that it
lacked WMD, that would constitute a material
breach.17
He replied
that although
Iraq had
reaffirmed that it had no such programme, “it would nevertheless
have some
time now to
check its records”. That might lead to a change of
position:
“If, on the
other hand, Iraq maintained that position, it would be up to those
who had
evidence of
such a programme to produce such evidence. If the inspectors came
up
with
evidence, that would be brought to the notice of the Security
Council.”
47.
Mr Blair
suggested that the UK should be working on the possibility
of
weakening
Saddam Hussein’s regime from within. He also wanted to agree a
wider
agenda of
action with the US.
48.
In a note to
No.10 officials on 17 November addressing a range of issues as
well
as Iraq,
Mr Blair wrote that he did not know if there was “anything in
the stories about
15
Letter
McDonald to Manning, 15 November 2002, ‘Conversation with US
Secretary of State’.
16
Telegram
1495 Washington to FCO London, 15 November 2002, ‘Iraq:
Triggers’.
17
UN Press
Briefing, 15 November 2002, Headquarters
Press Conference by Head of UN Iraq Weapons
Inspection
Team.
13