The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
634.
Adm Boyce
advised that:
“… the full
moon meant that a later start date […] would certainly be
preferable,
but that
the projected date was not a show stopper. The US military shared
the
preference
for a later date, but had been told to accept the earlier
date.”
635.
Sir David
Manning confirmed Mr Blair’s approval for the plan in a letter
to
Mr Watkins
the following day.221
636.
On 17 March,
Mr Watkins replied to a separate letter from Sir David Manning
of
14 March,
asking whether the MOD was confident that the military planning
took full
account of
the risks and problems identified in the JIC Assessment of Saddam
Hussein’s
plans to
defend Baghdad.222
637.
Mr Watkins
wrote that it “largely confirms the analysis” in the MOD advice
of
28 February.
In particular, it underlined the Iraqi regime’s “dilemma” about
whether to
withdraw
the RG’s heavy armour into Baghdad. The US intention was to make it
difficult
for heavy
units to reinforce the light forces providing the inner-city
defence. The Special
Republican
Guard was not trained to mount a guerrilla campaign.
638.
Mr Watkins
also wrote that:
“The
setting alight of oil-filled trenches has the potential to cause
some delay.
As with
Iraqi use of CBW, there is not much – apart from information
operations –
we can do
to stop the Iraqis doing it. But their effect on Coalition Forces
is likely
to be
limited … As the JIC paper notes, this tactic may be a two-edged
sword …
because it
is unlikely to encourage loyalty amongst the local population … But
we
must be
willing to recognise that the regime is likely to be willing to
inflict extreme
suffering
on its own population and seek to blame the Coalition.
“A key
variable is the extent to which the regime’s orders will be obeyed
and the
impact of
the early campaign on Iraqi forces’ will to fight. If necessary,
General
Franks is
prepared to mount an air assault to create an enclave within the
city from
which
operations could be mounted to combat resisting forces. As we noted
on
28 February,
in the worst case this could be a messy and protracted
process.”
639.
Sir David
Manning commented: “I take it that this amounts to a statement
that
MOD have
taken account of the factors/risks identified in the JIC
paper.”223
221
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The Military
Plan’.
222
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘JIC Paper: Saddam’s Plan for
Baghdad’.
223
Manuscript
comment Manning on Letter Watkins to Manning, 17 March 2003, ‘JIC
Paper: Saddam’s
Plan for
Baghdad’.
488