The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

the PMO.439 Mr Straw was taking “a much more bullish line, and wants Foster Wheeler

to deploy immediately”, but that would go beyond current UK travel advice and “play

badly if leaked to the press”. The official concluded that the final decision must rest with

Foster Wheeler.

741. The Annotated Agenda for the 6 May meeting of the AHMGIR advised that:

“If … the [Foster Wheeler] contract is terminated the impact may go beyond the

immediate loss of business and negatively affect the chances of other British

companies winning US contracts in Iraq.”440

742. At the meeting, Sir Stephen Brown reported that Mr O’Brien had spoken to Foster

Wheeler to emphasise the serious implications of its delayed deployment, including for

other UK companies.441

743. Mr Lusty advised Mr O’Brien on 10 May that if talks between Foster Wheeler

and the PMO broke down and Foster Wheeler sought UK Government support for

its position, the Government should take the line that this was a contractual issue and

not get drawn into a wider discussion on travel advice or the safety of foreign contractors

in Iraq.442

744. Mr Lusty advised that the FCO’s travel advice was clear. The decision on whether

to travel remained “a matter of personal or commercial judgement”. There was “no

agreed position” within the Government on reconciling FCO travel advice with the need

to pursue reconstruction. UKTI staff in Washington, Baghdad and the UK continued

to work with Foster Wheeler to help it address its security concerns.

745. A UKTI official informed Mr O’Brien on 14 May that Foster Wheeler and the PMO

had reached an agreement on deploying staff to Iraq.443

746. On 24 May, Mr Bob Morgan, an adviser to the Iraqi Oil Ministry employed by the

FCO, and his bodyguard Mr Mark Carman, were killed in Baghdad.444

747. Mr O’Brien spoke to Mr Ian Bill, Chairman and CEO of Foster Wheeler, on

26 May.445 Mr Bill said that although Foster Wheeler had deployed staff to Iraq, it

remained concerned that security provided by the PMO was not adequate. One of its

staff had already decided to leave as he was accommodated in a tent in the Green Zone

with no protection from mortar rounds.

439 Briefing DTI Energy Markets Unit, 5 May 2004, ‘Key Points Brief on DTI Issues: Ad Hoc Ministerial

Meeting on Iraq’.

440 Annotated Agenda, 6 May 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

441 Minutes, 6 May 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.

442 Minute Lusty to PS/O’Brien [FCO], 10 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Foster-Wheeler: Dealing with the Potential

Fallout’.

443 Minute Lusty to PS/O’Brien, 14 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Foster Wheeler Reach Agreement with the PMO’.

444 Minutes, 25 May 2004, Iraq Senior Officials Group meeting; BBC News, 26 May 2004, Oil Expert Killed

in Iraq ‘felt safe’.

445 Minute Lusty to PS/O’Brien, 26 May 2004, ‘Iraq: Foster-Wheeler’.

484